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Martinez Llanes: Foreign Nation Judgements: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

NOTES
FOREIGN NATION JUDGMENTS: RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN FLORIDA AND
THE STATUS OF FLORIDA JUDGMENTS ABROAD*
INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Florida has become a mecca for international trade and
2
investments., Eighty major multinational corporations have established their
3
Latin American headquarters in southern Florida. In 1977, goods exported
from Florida were valued at $5 billion,4 and it is estimated that the value of
5
total exports will increase at the rate of $1 billion annually. Participation in
6
the international market is not limited to the largest companies in the state.
Last year sixty-eight Florida companies traveled abroad to participate in trade
shows throughout Latin America, Europe and the Far East, generating an
estimated $39 million in sales. 7
The recent boom in transnational commercial relations and travel heralds
the dawn of Florida's role in the international market. As an increasing
number of Florida companies and business persons become involved in the
international market,8 legal disputes of an international nature will arise
This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the
best student note submitted in the Winter 1979 quarter.
1. See Berman, Miami Saved Again, FORBES, Nov. 1, 1977, at 37-40; Range, Sex in
America: Miami, PLAYBOY, Dec., 1978, at 144, 186; Woodburry, It's Your Turn in the Sun:
Miami, TIME, Oct. 16, 1978, at 48, 51-52; Miami: Headquarters Town for Latin Business,
BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 40-41 [hereinafter cited as Miami: Headquarters]; Florida is
a Steal of a Deal for Foreign Investors, FLORIDA TREND, Nov. 1978, at 34-43 [hereinafter cited
as Floridais a Steal].
2. Among these corporations are Exxon, Dupont, and General Electric. Woodburry,
supra note 1, at 52; Florida is a Steal, supra note 1, at 43.
3. Miami: Headquarters,supra note 1, at 40; Florida is a Steal, supra note 1, at 43.
4. In 1976 the figure was four billion dollars. Florida is a Steal, supra note 1, at 35.
5. Id.
6. Conversation between FLORIDA TREND journalist Jeffrey Tucker and Lois Yates, a
trade specialist with the Florida Department of Commerce. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The expansion of international trade and investment has also affected the once
primarily domestically-oriented banking services and personnel. Last year, one Miami-based
bank's international department received deposits in excess of $600 million, while another
smaller bank kept correspondent banking relationships with some 22 foreign banks to aid
in financing international transactions. There are now 13 Edge Act banks authorized by
law to transact foreign business. Six foreign-controlled banks and 12 foreign-owned banks
compete for foreign business and trade agreements. Deposits in Miami-based Edge Act banks
are reported to be over $1 billion. Id. at 35-41.
Florida real property has also become a major source of foreign investments. It is reported that acreage owned by foreigners amounts to about 1.4 million acres, or ad area
roughly as large as the Everglades.
The impact of international trade and investment in southern Florida is demonstrated by
EDITOR'S NOTE:
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more frequently.9 For example, a commercial dispute resolved by a judgment

rendered in the court of a foreign nation might remain unsatisfied because
the real and personal assets of the debtor, perhaps along with the debtor himself, are in Florida. An international legal dispute might also arise if a

Florida court entered a judgment against a foreign investor who had insufficient assets within Florida to satisfy the judgment.
The central question in these international disputes is whether the courts
in Florida or abroad will recognize and enforce the adjudication of a foreign
court. This note will consider factors affecting the resolution of this question

as well as matters related to the recognition and enforcement process. The
term "foreign judgment" will be used to depict the adjudication of a court
of a foreign country rather than a judgment of a sister state or territory of the
United States.1" The discussion will focus on civil money judgments rather

than other types of judgments which may involve strong national interests
and thus merit different consideration. 1 Nevertheless, because of the scarcity
of Florida authority dealing exclusively with money judgments, judgments in
the official bilingual and bicultural status of the region. Some 500,000 Latin travelers are

expected to come to the area during the 1978-1979 period. Florida is a Steal, supra note 1, at
42-43. This number will add to the present Spanish-speaking population, estimated to be
well over 430,000 in south Florida alone. The statewide estimate of Spanish-speaking citizens

is 669,000. Woodburry, supra note 1, at 51. See also Berman, supra note 1, at 40.
ST. L.J. 291,
9. See Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Oo
295-96 (1963).
10. This is the definition adopted in Lopez v. Avery, 66 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1953). A judgment may be defined as "the sentence of the law pronounced by the court on the matter
appearing from the pleadings in the action that puts an end to the action." H. TRAvWCK,
FLORIA PRACTCE AND PRocEDuRE, Judgments §25-1, at 357 (1978).
11. For example, real property interests within a nation's boundaries and judgments
pursuant to criminal laws or concerning marriages or adoptions involve special state
interests. See generally Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the
United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44 (1962). Adjudication of status is generally recognizable
in the United States and abroad because of the special interest in providing security of
adjudication. Nevertheless, these judgments, which compose the largest number of foreign
judgments for which enforcement is sought, have been denied recognition because of improper jurisdiction, "changed circumstances," or public policy considerations. See von Mehren
& Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach,
81 I-ARv. L. Ry. 1601, 1638 (1968).
In Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), a New
York court recognized a one-day Mexican divorce obtained by New York domiciliaries. For
a discussion of Rosenstiel, see Currie, Suitcase Divorce in the Conflict of Laws: Simons,
Rosenstiel and Borax, 34 U. Cim. L. Rrv. 26, 44-64 (1966). The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has followed the Rosenstiel approach, requiring that a "quicky" Mexican
divorce, rendered with mutual consent must be recognized in the Virgin Islands. Perrin v.
Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969). But see Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114,
190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963), aft'd, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d 123 (1964) (nonrecognition of such
a Mexican divorce).
In custody cases, the general rule applicable to sister-state adjudications, under which
the child's "best interest" is the primary consideration, also applied in the international
context. See, e.g.' Adamsen v. Adamsen, 151 Conn. 172, 195 A.2d 418 (1963) (equating the
effect of child custody adjudications by a state court with those of a foreign court). See
generally Ehrenzweig, Recognition of Custody Decrees Rendered Abroad, 2 AM. J. CoMP. L.
167 (1953).
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other legal areas must be analyzed in order to clarify substantive and procedural questions of Florida law.
While the terms "enforcement" and "recognition" are used interchangeably in the context of foreign judgments, 12 each depicts a unique process.
A foreign nation decree is said to be recognized if a court determines that the
particular subject matter has been fairly and finally adjudicated in the foreign
jurisdiction. 13 If such a determination is made, the court will not relitigate
the issue and will render its own judgment based on the foreign decree.14 The
court's reduction of the foreign judgment to a judgment of the forum recognizes
the foreign adjudication as conclusives and subject to the enforcement procedures applicable to a domestic judgment. 6 Such recognition of a foreign
nation judgment is, indeed, a prerequisite to its enforcement. The enforcement process affords a party affirmative relief pursuant to the right which was
initially recognized by the foreign court."
While recognition must precede enforcement, a party may seek recognition
without seeking enforcement.' 8 For example, a judgment rendered by a foreign
nation court could be presented by a party to the action as a complete or
partial defense,' 9 or a party might bring forth a declaratory judgment or determination of status which does not alone entitle him to any affirmative
relief.20 In such cases the judgment is recognizable but not enforceable.21
RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN JUDGMENT:
THE APPLICABLE LAw
In the United States the determination of the applicable substantive law
12. von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 38 (1974).
13. See generally von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States,
17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1977).
14. The recognition of an in rem judgment affecting property interests or personal
status is conclusive as against the entire world. On the other hand, recognition of an in
personam judgment is limited to the effects of res judicata and collateral estoppel as to
the issues litigated. Such judgments are binding only upon the parties to the original action.
Zaphiriou, Transnational Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 53 NoTRE DAME
LAw. 734, 734 (1978).
15. See Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 734.
16. See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 404; Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 748.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §92, Introductory Note (1971). The
term "judgment on the judgment" has been used to depict the enforcement process. In
effect, it is the judgment of a reviewing forum pursuant to a claim based upon a foreign
court's decree. Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments: A
Summary View of the Situation in the United States, 4 INT'L LAw. 720, 721 n.4 (1971).
18. See von Mhren, supra note 13, at 402.
19. Use of a foreign judgment as a defense requires only that the defendant have the
foreign decree properly authenticated for the judgment to be admitted into evidence. See,
e.g., Willson v. Willson, 55 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951). See notes 101-108 infra and accompanying
text.
20. REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §98, Introductory Note (1971).
21. This possibility is illustrated by Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947).
In Ogden the defendant predicated her motion to dismiss a divorce suit upon a prior
divorce decree rendered in her favor by the High Court of Justice in England. See text
accompanying notes 145-150 infra.
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depends on the nature of the particular question and not on whether the
matter is brought before a state or federal court.22 If the question presented

involves interpretation and application of the United States Constitution, an
act of Congress or a treaty, the question is federal in nature and governed by
federal law.23 Substantive issues which do not involve a federal question are
resolved by applying substantive state laws.The United States Supreme Court has not determined whether the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments presents federal questions. 25 The
United States Constitution vests the power to conduct foreign affairs in the
federal government. 26 Accordingly, the Supreme Court might conclude that
both recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is so closely tied to
international relations that the applicable standards should be established by
one uniform national body of law rather than by potentially conflicting state
laws.2 7 If confronted with the question; the Court has sufficient basis to rule
that either federal or state law should control. 2 Nevertheless, foreign judgment
recognition and enforcement has been and will continue to be governed by
state law until the Court confronts and resolves this issue."a
22. See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 402, 407.
23. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); McAllister v. St. Louis Merchants
Bridge Terminal Ry. Co., 324 Mo. 1005, 25 S.W.2d 791, 792 (1930). Issues dealing with
federal securities law present federal questions. See, e.g., Kahn v. American Metal Climax,
Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1970); Abdul-Rahman Omar
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
24. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 478 (1941). Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 350 F.2d 645,
647 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 906 (1965).
25. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 722. See generally Comment, Judgments Rendered
Abroad-State Law or Federal Law?, 12 VLL.L REv. 618 (1967).
26. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937); United States v. Curtis-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 39.
27. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 39. But see Golomb, Recognition of
Foreign Money Judgments: A Goal-Oriented Approach, 43 ST. JOnN's L. REv. 604, 641
(1969) (declaring that the area of foreign judgments is not so diplomatically sensitive as to
require federal preemption).
28. von Mehren, supra note 13, at 407. Legal scholars do not agree on the issue of
whether state or federal law should govern. Some suggest that one uniform federal law
should apply. See Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 805, 820 (1964); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered

Abroad, 50 COLum. L. Rm. 783, 788 (1950). Others urge that state law should govern unless
an individual state law is found to interfere with the exclusive federal domain of foreign
affairs. See Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 18 Am.J. Comp.
L. 367, 389-90 (1970); Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws
in the United States, 54 CALiF. L. Rav. 1599, 1607 (1966); Comment, supra note 25, at 630.
The distinction between these two views may prove to be merely academic. Even if federal
preemption occurred, the substantive rules now applied by individual states might not be
altered. See von Mehren, supra note 18, at 408.
29. This is the view of both federal and state courts. See generally Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Tremblay, 233 U.S. 185 (1912); Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453
F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l
Bank, 350 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1965); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D.
Mass. 1966). See also Johnson v. Compagnie CGn&rale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152
N.E. 121 (1926); R-SrATEMFNT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws §98, Comment 3 (1971); von
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In Erie Railroad v. Tompkinso and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing

Co.,

31

the United States Supreme Court restricted the freedom of

federal courts to apply federal common law in cases where jurisdiction is based
upon diversity of citizenship3 2 The Erie case held that "[e]xcept in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be
applied in a case is the law of the State.... There is no federal general common
law. ''3 3 The Klaxon Court, following Erie, determined that the conflicts law
of the state where the case is brought determines the choice of law when a
question exists concerning which law is applicable. 34
The Supreme Court established a rule of federal common law applicable
to foreign judgments in the pre-Erie 1895 decision of Hilton v. Guyot.35 The
question in Hilton was whether to recognize a judgment rendered in France
against United States defendants who resided in New York. The Court declined to accord conclusive effect to the French judgment because a United
States judgment would be denied conclusive effect in a French court.3 6 The
law applied in Hilton was not the substantive law of the forum state; rather,
'a
it was based on the international theories of "mutuality" and "reciprocity."
The Hilton doctrine of reciprocity became the federal common law in the
area of recognition of foreign judgments.As No Supreme Court case since
Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 39. Compare Homburger, supra note 28, at 383-85
with Golomb, supra note 27, at 635 and von Mehren, supra note 13, at 407.
30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
32. Compare Erie with Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). In Swift, the Court
applied federal common law in a case involving diversity of citizenship.
33. 304 U.S. at 78 (1938). See Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 405-07 (1964). For a discussion of the development
of "federal common law" subsequent to Erie, see Comment, supra note 25, at 622-23.
34. Federal courts have followed Erie by applying state substantive law rather than
federal common law. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
440 (3d Cir. 1971); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l Bank, 350 F.2d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 1965);
Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Mass. 1966). To date, no case has
recognized the existence of a uniform federal law in this area having possible effects on
foreign affairs.
35. 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (5-4 decision). Pre-Hilton decisions dealing with foreign judgment recognition were based on English precedent. The English cases held that although
an action on a foreign money judgment was permissible, the foreign adjudication would
serve only as prima facie evidence of the existing debt. American courts usually permitted
all defenses which were or could have been raised in the initial action to be reexamined
in the second action. See Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement
of Conflict of Laws, 72 COLUmt. L. REv. 220, 224-30 (1972).
36. 159 U.S. at 227-28. The American defendants had been doing business in France
but fled to the United States before the judgment was satisfied; consequently, the Frenchmen brought suit on the foreign judgment in federal court in New York.
37. Id. For an explanation of reciprocity, see text accompanying notes 133-152 infra.
38. Since Hilton, there have been two United States Supreme Court cases dealing with
the effect accorded judgments from foreign nations. Neither case confronted the issue of
reciprocity. See Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927) (recognizing a judgment from
a British court in Hong Kong brought before a United States Territorial Court in the
Philippines); Hapai v. Brown, 239 U.S. 502 (1916) (recognizing a judgment rendered in
the Kingdom of Hawaii prior to annexation). Compare Peterson, supra note 35, at 233-36
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Hilton has recognized the existence of a uniform federal common law in the
area of foreign judgments. The decision represents the only Supreme Court
exposition on the subject. The Supreme Court's position, if presented with
the question in light of the Erie decision's disposal of a federal common law,
is not entirely predictable. 39
Two United States Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's may shed some
light on the Court's position with respect to the applicable law in the area
of foreign judgments. Although neither of the cases concerned recognition of a
foreign decree, the Court studied analogous issues. In the 1964 case of Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,40 the Court determined that federal law and
policy apply to matters which involve foreign expropriation decrees. The
case involved Cuba's seizure without compensation of sugar owned by an
American. According to the Court, the action could not be questioned by
United States courts since it constituted an act of state.41 Mr. Justice Harlan,
writing for the majority, concluded that the act of state doctrine was "intrinsically federal" 42 and thus binding upon both state and federal courts as a
matter of federal common law.43
The Sabbatino case is one of the major recent decisions expanding the body
of federal common law to promote national uniformity and increase the role
of federal policy in the area of foreign affairs.44 Although the question presented in Sabbatino involved the rights of private individuals, the Court found
that federal law governed because the matter pertained to "ordering our relationship with other members of the international community." 4 The decision focused not on whether a cause of action is private or public in nature,
but rather on "the federal nature of the function involved or the need for
uniformity in an area of national concern." 46 This indicates that in the
(confirming the existence of authority for the inference that recognition will be given if
reciprocity is found to exist) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuar OF LAws §98(e) (1971).
39. See Golomb, supra note 27, at 634; Peterson, supra note 35, at 224; Zaphiriou, supra
note 14, at 748 n.100; Comment, supra note 25, at 618, 626-27. Some commentators have
concluded that state courts are not bound by Hilton's reciprocity requirement. See Zaphiriou,
supra note 14, at 737. See notes 133-152 infra and accompanying text.
40. 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (8-1 decision).
41. The Court, in describing the "act of state" concept, referred to Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897): "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress
of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves." 376 U.S. at 416. Congress promptly
reassessed the Sabbatino holding and declared that an act of state is reviewable by the
United States court to search for possible violations of international law. The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-633, §301(d), 78 STAT. 1013 (amending 22 U.S.C. §2370(e)
(1964)).

42. 376 U.S. at 427.
43. Id. See also Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1965).
Fee generally Edwards, The Erie Doctrine in Foreign Affairs Cases, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv, 674

(1967).
44. 376 U.S. at 424-25. See Henkin, supra note 28, at 819.
45. 376 U.S. at 425.
46. Comment, supra note 25, at 625.
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context of adjudications by courts of foreign nations, the fact that the case
involves a private dispute may not determine the applicable law. Rather, the
question of which law applies may depend on whether the court finds that
foreign judgments are akin to acts of state, 47 thus requiring the application of
a uniform national policy. 48 Such an extension of the Sabbatino rational is
possible if the judiciary of a foreign country is viewed as an arm of the
sovereign.

49

The direction taken by Sabbatino was followed in the 1968 Supreme Court
case of Zschernig v. Miller.50 In Zschernig, the Court invalidated a state law
which denied inheritance rights to residents of foreign nations if those nations
did not grant reciprocal rights to United States citizens.51 The majority
reasoned that such a state law requires inquiries into and value judgments
about the administration of foreign law, thus intruding on the exclusive federal
52
domain of international and diplomatic relations.
The Supreme Court's opinions in Sabbatino and Zschernig appear to
support the application of federal law when international overtones are involved. 5 3 By the same rationale, the issue of foreign judgment recognition and

enforcement might be categorized as federal in nature. This would seem particularly likely if, when deciding whether to recognize a foreign judgment, a
state court conducts inquires into or makes value judgments about the legal
system of the rendering nation. 5 4 The application of a federal common law to
resolve disputes concerning foreign judgments would not be inconsistent with
Erie in light of the constitutional supremacy of federal law in the area of
foreign affairs.
Strong practical arguments have been advanced in favor of a uniform
federal law to govern the area of judgment recognition. 55 It has been suggested
that judgments from United States state courts frequently are not recognized
abroad because the foreign court assumes that an American state court would
not accord reciprocal recognition to its judgments.56 This assumption results
from the fact that there is no clear federal common law nor any federal statute
or treaty which specifies the treatment to be accorded by the United States.
47. See Scoles, supra note 28, at 1605-07, which analogizes acts of state and foreign
judgments.
48. See Reese, supra note 28, at 788; von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 39;
Comment, supra note 25, at 625-26.
49. See Henkin, supra note 28, at 820; Comment, supra note 25, at 627. But see Golomb,
supra note 27, at 611.
50. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
51. The statute was Oan. REv. STAT. §111.070 (1968).
52. 389 U.S. at 440-41. See Golomb, supra note 27, at 638-39; von Mehren, supra note 13,
at 408.
53. See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 402 n.5, 407 (possibility of foreign judgments
being governed by a uniform federal law because of their effect on foreign affairs). But see
Golomb, supra note 27, at 641 (suggesting that the area of foreign judgment recognition is
not so diplomatically sensitive).
54. von Mehren, supra note 13, at 408. But see Golomb, supra note 25, at 641.
55. See Homburger, supra note 29, at 389-90; Scoles, supra note 28, at 1607; von Mehren,
supra note 13, at 408, 414-15; Comment, supra note 25, at 628.
56. See text accompanying notes 133-152 infra for a discussion of reciprocity.
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The foreign court, unfamiliar with the bifurcated federal and state judicial
structure, might not search for the appropriate state law and therefore
conclude that no United States law allows for reciprocal recognition of judgments.57 A federal law, treaty, or state version of a uniform act would enable.
the foreign court to more easily comprehend federal or state law on judgment
recognition. 58 This would lead to more effective enforcement of American
judgments abroad. 59
SouRcEs OF SUBsTANIVE LAw

The applicable sources of law which determine the effectiveness of a
foreign nation judgment can be classified into three groups: statutory law,
treaties, and the common law. Several states have enacted statutes to regulate
the recognition of foreign adjudications60 while treaties and multinational
conventions have also developed. 6' Although Florida law is presently created
strictly by the judiciary,62 the possibility that Florida will codify its common
law or be subject to an international treaty regulating judgment recognition
requires consideration of all three sources.
Statutory Law: Trends Toward Codification
In recent years some states have taken steps to enact legislation regulating
57. See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 408; Comment, supra note 25, at 630. See notes
63 & 65 infra.
58. See Golomb, supra note 27, at 644-45; Homburger, supra note 29, at 868 n.3.
59. On December 29, 1972, the Committee on International Law of the New York State
Bar Association submitted the following report and resolution to the House of Delegates
of the New York State Bar Association: "Judgments rendered in foreign countries have
generally been recognized and enforced in the United States provided only that the rendering
court had jurisdiction and that the defendant was given adequate notice and adequate
opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, non-recognition of United States' judgments
abroad is the rule rather than the exception. Starting with the Common Market countries,
United States judgments are not enforceable in the Netherlands because its law requires
the existence of a treaty; they are reexamined on the merits in Belgium; they are subject
to a statutory reciprocity requirement in Germany that is often difficult to establish to the
satisfaction of the German courts, which are accustomed to look to statutes rather than to
court decisions; and they are by statute subject to reexamination on the merits in Italy if
rendered by default. In the Scandinavian countries, a treaty is needed for enforcement. In
the rest of Western Europe, as well as in Latin America, the situation does not differ substantially. Under the Code of Quebec, any defense which might have been made in the
original action may be pleaded against a judgment rendered outside Canada. Conclusive
effect is also denied United States judgments in some other Canadian provinces as well."
N.Y. STrTE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF COMMITTEErON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972) (quoted in von Mehren, supra note 13, at 406 n.25).
60. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 720.
61. See notes 76-82 infra and accompanying text.
62. See text accompanying notes 144-242 infra for an analysis and discussion of the
Florida case law dealing with foreign judgments. Throughout other states, judgment recognition is governed primarily by common, rather than statutory, law. See Comment, supra note
25, at 620. See also H. SNrr & A. MILLER, INTERN(TION(L CO-OPER(TION IN CIVWL LITIGATION A REPORT ON PRACrICES AND PROCEDURES PREVAIUNG IN THE UNITED STATEs 28-29 (1961);
Reese, supra note 28, at 788.
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the area of foreign judgment recognition. There are isolated state statutes
dealing with judgments from specified nations, 63 particular kinds of judgments, 6 4 or procedural or evidentiary matters. 65 The most recent goal-oriented
codification is the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. 66 To
6 7
date, eleven states have adopted the Uniform Act.

The Uniform Act does not attempt to introduce a revolutionary method
for handling the recognition of foreign judgments: it merely codifies the
common law.es The Uniform Act pertains only to recognition of money
judgments, and other judgments will continue to be governed by separate
statutes, if any, or uncodified common law rules. The purpose of the codification is to provide statutory authority for the code-conscious civil law countries.
Many of those jurisdictions have required reciprocal recognition of their
final decrees and have failed to find adequate authority for such recognition
in the common law. 69 Although codification does not guarantee solution of the
63. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §524:11 (Supp. 1972), which provides for reciprocal
recognition of Canadian judgments to the extent that the state's judgments are enforceable
in Canada.
64. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §31 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1973). This statute deals
with the reciprocal recognition of Canadian support decrees.
65. For a review of legislation related to foreign judgment recognition, see Peterson,
supra note 9, at 296-99. A discussion of Florida procedural statutes relating to recognition
of a foreign judgment is found at text accompanying notes 101-129 infra.
Montana and Oregon are among the states which have enacted statutes on the enforcement of foreign judgments. See MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §93-1001-27 (1947); ORE. REV. STAT.
§43.190 (1953).
66. 13 U.L.A. 269 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Recognition Act]. For a detailed
analysis of the Act, see generally Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New
York: The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. I
(1968). The full text of the Uniform Act appears in von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12,
at 41 n.14.
67. Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington have enacted the Uniform Recognition AcL ALASKA
STAT. §§09.30.100-.180 (1972); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§1713.1-1713.8 (West Supp. 1977); GA.
CODE ANN. tit. 110, §§1301-1308 (Supp. 1978); 2 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, §§121-129 (1969);
MD. CODE ANN. art. 35, §10-701-709 (1974 amend.) MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 235, §23A
(Supp. 1976); MIca. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§691.1151-59 (1968); N.Y. Civ. PROC. LAW §§5301-5309
(McKinney Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§710-718 (Supp. 1975); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§6.40.010-.915 (Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT. §§24.200-.255 (1977) (cited in Scoles &
Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Nation Judgments: California, Oregon,
and Washington, 57 ORE. L. RPv. 377, 382 (1978)).
68. See Carl, Recognition of Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations and Vice
Versa, 13 Hous. L. REv. 680, 688-97 (1976); Kulzer, supra note 66, at 5. See also Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 269, 269-70 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Prefatory Note].
69. See Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. at 273-74. See also §4 of the Prefatory Note,
13 U.L.A. at 269. See also Homburger, supra note 28, at 370 n.10; Kulzer, supra note 66, at 1.
See generally Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A Historical-Critical
Analysis, 16 LA. L. REV. 465 (1956).
Other common law countries, recognizing the nonrecognition problem, have responded
with uniform national legislation. For example, in 1933 Great Britain adopted the Foreign
Judgment Recognition and Enforcement Act, which codified British law and provided for
a speedy enforcement procedure. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933,
23 9- 24 Geo. 5, c.13. Canada has enacted similar statutory authority. See generally Castel,
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reciprocal recognition problem, the state will comply with civil law preferences
without sacrificing its own established jurisprudence by merging the common
law case system into the civil law codification system. Legal scholars have
long advocated codification of the rules regulating recognition of foreign
money judgments in this country as a step toward uniform treatment and
recognition of United States judgments abroad. 0 Thus, codification could be
a step toward international uniformity and stability.71
Under the Uniform Act, a final judgment from a foreign nation will be
presumed conclusive unless proven otherwise. Nonrecognition results from
proof of a valid affirmative defense. The traditional common law defenses
which will permit, rather than require, the reviewing court to deny recognition have been codified in the Uniform Act. For example, a foreign judgment
is nonconclusive if the rendering tribunal is not impartial, does not follow procedures which meet the requirements of due process, or has no basis for jurisdiction over the case. 72 Other defenses include fraud, insufficient notice, public
policy, finality, inconvenience of the first forum and prior settlement between
the parties.7s
Personal jurisdiction exists under the Uniform Act if the defendant was
served personally within the adjudicating state, made a voluntary and nonspecial appearance in the initial proceeding, agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, was domiciled in the foreign state, or if the claim
arose from operation of a motor vehicle or aircraft in the foreign state.74 In
addition, a foreign court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a corporate
defendant if the corporation had its principal place of business or had acquired
corporate status in the foreign state, or if it had a business office in the
foreign state and the initial proceedings were related to the business conducted
75
'through that office.
Jurisdiction and Money Judgments Rendered Abroad: Anglo-American and French Practice
Compared, 4 McGxu. L.J. 152 (1958).
70. See Carl, supra note 68, at 686-87; Kulzer, supra note 66, at 2-3; Nadelmann, NonRecognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What To Do About It, 42 IowA
L. Rv. 236, 252 (1957). Some commentators have stressed the need for a federal statute
or treaty. See generally Groupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & Commp. L.Q. 367 (1963).
71. In its Prefatory Note to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,
the National Conference of Commissioners declared that "[c]odification by a state of its
rules on the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it
more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized abroad." Prefatory Note,
13 U.L.A. at 269.
72. Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. §4(a), at 273.
73. See, e.g., Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.LA. §4(b)(5)-(6), at 273-76.
74. Id. §5(a) at 275.
75. Id. However, United States courts have upheld the foreign courts' jurisdictional
grounds even though they were not in compliance with the provisions of the Uniform
Recognition Act. See generally Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d
435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (sufficient basis of jurisdiction existed
where defendant's contact was made through an English distributor); H.L. Wilkinson & Co.
v. Calvine Mills, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 675, 282 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1967) (sufficient jurisdictional
basis existed for breach of contract action in England, because the contract had been made
there); Plugmay, Ltd. v. National Dynamics Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 913, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Civ.
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Treaties:A FederalSolution
Treaties may be the most effective means to encourage mutual recognition
of judgments. 76 At present, the United States is not a party to any treaty
which would obligate contracting nations to recognize judgments rendered
pursuant to its terms. 77 In recent years, however, there have been notable
efforts by the United States, as well as by other major trading countries, to
use the treaty method to accomplish greater stability in private international
law.7 For example, the member nations of the European Economic Community have recently entered into a multilateral treaty regulating judgment
79
recognition.
Ct. N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 53 Misc. 2d 451, 278 N.Y.S.2d 896 (App. Term 1967) (sufficient basis of
jurisdiction found where default judgment entered by English court arose from goods sold
and shipped to England by defendant, constituting a "single act" as required by New York
statute to establish proper jurisdiction). But see Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp.
1243. 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (citing CALIF. CIV. PROC. CODE §1713.5(b) (West)).
76. Golomb, supra note 27, at 645-52; Nadelmann, Uniform Legislation Versus International Conventions Revisited, 16 AM. J. COMp. L. 28, 31-33 (1968); von Mehren, supra note
13, at 413; Comment, supra note 25, at 629. The federal government has the power to enter
into a bilateral or multilateral treaty providing for the recognition of foreign judgments.
See Homburger, supra note 28, at 368 n.3. But see Kulzer, Some Aspects of Enforceability of
Foreign Judgments: A Comparative Summary, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 84 (1966).
77. Carl, supra note 68, at 681; Scoles & Aarnas, supra note 67, at 395; von Mehren &
Patterson, supra note 12, at 43.
78. The treaty approach has been widely used in civil law countries. See Groupner,
supra note 71, at 368.
79. The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters [hereinafter cited as the European Convention] became effective
on Feb. 1, 1973. 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 299) 32 (1972) (translated in 2 CoMM. MET.
REP. (CCH) 6003). For discussion of the various drafts of the Convention, see generally
Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments- Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 Am. J. COMP. L.
149 (1968). The six original members of the European Economic Community (EEC) Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands -were parties to the
European Convention. The new member states- Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom-were bound by the European Convention pursuant to article 220 of the European
Economic Treaty; see 1 CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) and article 3(2) of the Act of Accession, 2
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 7035.
Most judgments excluded from recognition by the Hague Convention, see note 81 infra,
are excluded from recognition under the European Convention, with the exception of
judgments involving maintenance matters (European Convention, arts. 1, 5(2)), and judgments which determine the status of companies and other legal persons or adjudicate the
powers of these entities' officers and directors. See Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 736. It has
been suggested that these judgments were not excluded from recognizable judgments as in
other conventions because the European Economic Community is an economic union attempting to attain judgment recognition characteristics similar to those of the United
States federal system. The effect of the treaty has been compared with the workings of the
full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. Id.
The primary aim of the European Convention is to provide uniformity and stability
to member nations of the European Economic Community. See 2 CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
6255. The European Convention demands that member state A recognize the judgments
of member state B which are rendered against a nondomiciliary of state A. See von Mehren,
supra note 13, at 414. The effect of the provision is that any judgment rendered in state B
which is covered by the treaty, including one which would have been improperly rendered
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In 1968, the United States acceded to the United Nations Convention on
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 80 Based on the
rising incidence of arbitration clauses in transnational commercial agreements,
this step may be nearly as significant as a treaty on judgment recognition. In
addition, since 1963 this country has participated in the Hague Conference
on Private International Law and the International (Rome) Institute for
Uniform Private Law.8 ' Widespread participation in these multinational conventions reflects worldwide concern over the problem of nonrecognition.
in state A because of a major jurisdictional defect, would be recognizable and enforceable
against the assets of the unsuccessful litigant within the territorial limits of state A. For
example, if an in personam judgment is rendered by a German court against a United
States defendant who did not voluntarily appear in Germany or was not domiciled or otherwise present within the German jurisdiction, the German judgment would be enforceable
against the assets of the American defendant located within the jurisdiction of the
addressed member state. Id. Unquestionably, this result would be inimical to the most fundamental law and public policy of that member state. See text accompanying notes 206-216
infra.
Article 59 of the European Convention allows member nations to deny recognition
through the execution of bilateral treaties with third nonmember nations when, for
example, the original judgment was based on an exorbitant jurisdictional base not in
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements as provided in the bilateral treaty. It
appears, therefore, that the United States should adopt the bilateral treaty approach to avoid
seizure of its residents' property abroad. The addressed EEC member state would then be
able to deny recognition to judgments rendered by other EEC nations against a United
States defendant if the jurisdictional base was not in compliance with the bilateral agreement. The United Kingdom-United States Convention, see note 82 infra, will protect
United States defendants against enforcement by the United Kingdom of a judgment obtained in another EEC country based on exorbitant jurisdictional concepts. See de Winter,
Excessive Jurisdictionin Private International Law, 17 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 706, 715-16 (1968).
See also von Mehren, supra note 13, at 414.
80. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Dec. 29,
1970) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention]. S. Ras. 813, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1968). In approving the international agreement, the United States Senate stated that
the United States would apply reciprocity principles in recognizing and enforcing awards
covered by the Convention. Foreign Arbitral Awards Convention, art. 1, §3. In addition, the
treaty provides that only those awards which were conclusive in countries assenting to the
Convention would be subject to recognition. Id. at art. V, §1. The Convention is limited
in scope to awards arising from matters considered commercial under United States law.
Recognition of arbitral awards is related to, but nevertheless distinct from, recognition of
foreign judgments. The latter is not within the domain of the Foreign Arbitral Awards
Convention. For further discussion on the Convention, see generally von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 12, at 76.
81. See generally Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, reprinted in 15 AM. J. Comp. L. 862 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hague Convention] 5 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 636 (1966). See also Nadelmann,
The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 80 LAW &
CONTMIP. PRoB. 291 (1965). United States delegates have registered their support for the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, the main text of which was adopted in 1966, with a later supplementary
protocol in the same year pertaining to questions of jurisdiction. Supplementary Protocol
to the Hague Convention, reprinted in 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 869 (1967).
Article 21 of the Hague Convention provides that for the treaty to take effect between
any two nations, the member countries must enter into a supplementary agreement providing for specific adoption. This requirement will permit the contracting countries to alter
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The most recent and dramatic step in seeking favorable treatment of this
nation's judgments abroad is an already initialed treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom which will provide for recognition and enforcement in either country of judgments that satisfy the jurisdictional requirements set forth in the treaty. 2 The United Kingdom-United States Convention
has not been submitted to the United States Senate for ratification as of this
writing. If the Convention is ratified, it will have the distinction of being the
first substantial action taken by the United States to ensure the recognition
abroad of judicial decrees of this nation's states. Moreover, it could serve as
the foundation for future bilateral and multilateral negotiations between the
United States and other nations.
certain terms of the Convention under article 23. The parties may further clarify any of the
terms appearing in the original draft of the Hague Convention and may add to the
existing list of agreements with any of the participating nations. Those participating
members include Austria, Finland, Greece, Israel, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey and the United Arab Republic. See generally Zaphiriou, supra note 14,
at 735.
The Hague Convention reflects international concern over the problem of nonrecognition.
Article I of the Convention covers the recognition of most judicial decrees except those
which either determine the status or capacity of an individual or relate to family matters
(whether personal or proprietary in nature), or which demand payment of any customs
duty, tax, or penalty. The last exception is in accord with the general view that foreign
judgments pertaining to revenue or penal matters will not be enforced. See notes 237-241
infra and accompanying text. Similarly, this provision of the Hague Convention was incorporated in subsection 1(2), the Uniform Recognition Act, which expressly excludes the
recognition of "a judgment for taxes, a fine, or other penalty ...." Zaphiriou, sjupra note 14,
at 735 n.7. See note 66 supra. In addition, the Hague Convention does not cover judicial decrees which order provisional or protective measures, or judgments rendered by any administrative body. See Hague Convention, art. 2(2).
82. Convention between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
and the United States of America Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters, Oct. 26, 1976, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEcAL MAT. 71 (1977).
[hereinafter cited as the United Kingdom-United States Convention]. Negotiations between
the United Kingdom and the United States began in 1973, culminating in the agreement
on reciprocal recognition of judgments. The United Kingdom-United States Convention
will affect judgment recognition between contracting nations in a manner similar to that
contemplated by the Hague Convention. See note 81 supra. Under article 15(1), the United
Kingdom-United States Convention will cover judgments other than money judgments if
such are in accordance with the laws of the reviewing nation. The treaty will exclude the
recognition of judgments "to the extent that they are punitive or multiple damages."
United Kingdom-United States Convention, art. 2(2)(b). Thus, an award of treble damages
in a civil matter would not be recognizable pursuant to the treaty. See Zaphiriou, supra
note 14, at 736. See also Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 TEx. INT'L L.J. 421 (1976).
Because of criticism primarily from British insurance interests, the 1976 draft of the
Convention was reviewed in a Cambridge, Massachusetts meeting held in September, 1978.
According to the United States delegation, there are two changes in the most recent version
of the Convention which are of fundamental importance: the addition of article 8A and
the deletion of article 3. A copy of the proposed text may be obtained from the Legal Advisor's Office. It is hoped that in the forthcoming negotiations between the delegations of
the two nations, a second and final ad referendum text will be initialed and subsequently
ratified by both nations. Memorandum from the Office of Michel H. Cardozo, American
Association of Law Schools Representative of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on
Private International Law, to Law School Deans (March, 1979).
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The Common Law: Florida'sApproach
Substantive rules which have arisen under the common law generally provide the basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. A
number of theories in support of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have been advanced in the United States and other nations.Ps Among
the policy considerations which support the existing theories are the desires
to protect successful parties from continued harassment by previously unsuccessful litigants, minimize duplication of efforts and the resulting waste of time
and money, and foster stability and uniformity in an international sphere.84
The Florida supreme court has expressly noted that the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is not governed by the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution s5 because that clause is applicable solely to
the judgments of sister-states.88 Florida courts have relied on the doctrines of
international or judicial comity in dealing with the recognition of foreign
judgmentss or issues of reciprocity.88 Unlike the full faith and credit clause,
comity8 9 allows the reviewing court the flexibility necessary to balance con83. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 723; Kulzer, supra note 76, at 86-87.
84. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11, at 1602-05. All of the theories seek to
advance "the elements of stability and unity essential to an international order in which
many aspects of life are not confined within the limits of any single jurisdiction." Id. at 1603.
See also Golomb, supra note 27, at 618-19; Reese, supra note 28, at 783-86.
Legal scholars generally favor measures to promote finality by ending continued harassment by unsuccessful parties. These same policies support the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971);
H. GOODRICH & E. SCOL.S, CONFLICT or LAWs §217 (4th ed. 1964); RSrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTICrr OF LAws §98, Comment b (1971).
85. U.S. CoNsr. art. 4, §1; 28 U.S.C. §1738 (1976) (implementing statute). Under this
mandate, a valid judgment of one state must be conclusively recognized by a sister-state, notwithstanding conflicts with the public policy of the recognizing state. For a thorough review
of the history of this clause, see Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section I of
Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments
of that Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUM. L REV. 470 (1904). See generally Reese
& Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUm. L. R.v. 153 (1949);
Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A. L. RFv. 441 (1955).
86. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464, 475 (Fla. 1950); Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 610,
33 So. 2d 870, 874 (1947); Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 636-38, 21 So. 2d 141, 141-42 (1945).
See generally Peterson, supra note 9.
Some commentators suggest that the full faith and credit clause mandates that foreign
judgments be recognizable to the same extent as those from sister.states. See, e.g., Golomb,
supra note 27, at 606.
87. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 143 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1962); Ogden v. Ogden,
159 Fla. 604, 608-09, 33 So. 2d 870, 873-74 (1947). For a historical overview of the comity of
nations doctrine, see Golomb, supra note 27, at 613; Smit, supra note 11, at 54.
88. Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 792-93, 75 So. 35, 45 (1917). See text accompanying
notes 144-152 infra for a discussion of the reciprocity issue in Florida in relation to defending an action on a foreign judgment.
89. The "comity" concept as it relates to foreign judgments was first advanced by the
United States Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 US. 113 (1895). At the interstate level,
the comity standard has been applied if the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable.
See, e.g., Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935); Ogden v. Ogden,
159 Fla. 604, 610, 33 So. 2d 870, 874 (1947).
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flicting policy considerations.9" These considerations include the interest in
protecting the successful litigant from duplicative efforts, thus promoting international stability, and the state's interest in protecting its domiciliaries against
judgments which may be subversive to concepts of fundamental due process
and fairness. 91
Florida courts have usually looked for elements which "would support
it [the foreign judgment] if procured in this country" 92 before using the
doctrines of judicial comity or reciprocity. Florida case law indicates that
these elements include grounds for bringing the action, 93 fair trial on the
merits,9 4 domicile, 95 jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter,96
notice,97 finality, 99 and the absence of fraud.99 The Florida common law dealing
with substantive defenses is analyzed in greater detail in subsequent sections
of this note. 100
FLORIDA LAW: PROCEDURES FOR RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FoREIGN JUDGMENTS

A Florida practitioner might be asked to have a judgment rendered by a
foreign nation court executed against the assets of a judgment debtor located
within Florida. Because the foreign judgment must be recognized before it is
enforced, the party seeking execution must initiate an action introducing the
foreign decree as proof of his claim and remedy. Section 92.032 of the Florida
Statutes establishes the procedure to be followed in this situation. 01' The peti90. As noted in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 163-64, comity "is neither a matter of
absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will. . . . [I]t is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."
91. On the other hand, recognition of a judgment from the court of a sister-state is
mandated by the full faith and credit clause, although such recognition might be contrary
to the reviewing state's public policy. See generally Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action (pt. 2), 73 HARv. L. REv. 268 (1959); Comment, Full Faith and Credit
to Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 CAUiF. L. RFv. 282 (1966).
92. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 610, 33 So. 2d 870, 874 (1947) (citing Parker v. Parker,
155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141 (1945)).
93. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 143 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962).
94. Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965).
95. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 143 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962).
96. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 1950). See also Willson v. Willson, 55 So. 2d
905 (Fla. 1951); Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 203 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1967). See text accompanying notes 153-176 infra.
97. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464, 467 (Fla. 1950); Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174
So. 2d 71, 72 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). See alsp Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141
(1945).
98. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 607-08, 33 So. 2d 870, 873 (1947). See text accompanying
notes 217-224 infra.
99. Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 636, 21 So. 2d 141, 142 (1945); Warren v. Warren, 73
Fla. 764, 789-90, 75 So. 35, 44 (1917); Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71, 72
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). See text accompanying notes 206-216 infra.
100. See text accompanying notes 144-242 infra.
101. FLA. STAT. §92.032 (1977) states: "Foreign documents; procedure for admitting in
evidence.- A copy of any official foreign document or record or entry therein, certified by
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tion for recognition must state the nature of the claim and the final foreign
adjudication. In support of the petition, the judgment must be submitted into
evidence pursuant to a mandatory three-step authentication procedure. First,
the petitioner must procure a copy of the original decree certified by a lawful
custodian of the rendering court. Secondly, the decree must be accompanied
by a certificate issued by an official of the foreign government, confirming that
the lawful custodian who certified the foreign decree acted in his official
capacity and that the certification complied with the laws of the foreign nation.
Finally, the decree must be certified by the United States consulate in the
foreign country and confirm, under the seal of his office, both the government
official's capacity to sign as an official of the foreign nation and the genuine1
ness of the government official's signature.

02

The question of adequate authentication of a foreign judicial decree has
been litigated in Florida. In Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union,Ltd. 03
the court was confronted with the question of whether to recognize a Canadian
money judgment rendered against a Florida domiciliary.j4 At trial, the creditorplaintiffs presented the Canadian decree for admission into evidence without
the authentication required by section 92.032. The decree was accompanied
only by an affidavit signed by the president of the creditor corporation. The
appellate court found the affidavit to be incompetent and insufficient 1 5 The
Jackson court recognized that a contended foreign judgment presents a question
of fact which must be properly authenticated to be admitted as valid. 06
the lawful custodian thereof, shall be admissible in evidence in all courts of this state ift
all cases now pending or hereafter commenced to prove the contents thereof when accompanied by a certificate of an official of such foreign government that such lawful
custodian has certified such copy in his official capacity and in accordance with the laws
of such foreign country and when this accompanying certificate is authenticated by a
certificate of a consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country, under
the seal of his office, that the person signing such accompanying certificate is such official
of such foreign government and the signature appearing on such accompanying certificate is
genuine."
102. Id. Foreign decrees which do not conform to the statute's three-step authentication procedure are generally inadmissible. See, e.g., Martens v. Martens, 284 N.Y. 363, 81
N.E.2d 489 (1940).
103. 178 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965).
104. Recognition of the foreign money judgment was eventually denied on grounds of
improper jurisdiction over the Florida domiciliaries. Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit
Union, Ltd., 203 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967).
105. 178 So. 2d at 59. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the lower courts
because the improperly authenticated foreign decree was the basis for the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment. Id. at 61.
106. Quoting 3 B. JoNEs, EvENCE §671 (1958), the court stated: "In an early case
in the Supreme Court of the United States, it was determined that foreign judgments may
be authenticated in the following modes: (1) By an exemplification under the great seal; (2)
by a copy proved to be a true copy; (3) by the certificate of an officer authorized by law,
which certificate itself must be properly authenticated. These are the usual, and appear to
be the most proper, if not the only modes of verifying foreign judgments. If they be all
beyond the reach of the party, other testimony inferior in its nature may be received. It is
evident that this includes the common law method of proof by a sworn copy." 178 So. 2d at
59.
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In addition to holding that the judgment did not meet the requirements
of section 92.032, the court found that the affidavit submitted by the president
of the Canadian corporation did not authenticate the foreign decree because
it did not "attempt to authenticate the purported copy attached to the complaint," or "even state that he [the president] has ever seen the original or
compared the copy [of the Canadian decree] with the original."'07 This
language implies that an alternative procedure for authenticating a foreign
judgment exists when for certain reasons all requirements of section 92.032
cannot be met. For example, if the original official document is lost by the
foreign court and the only existing record of the judgment is the copy in the
hands of the party seeking recognition, that party may be able to authenticate
the document by submitting a full and complete affidavit proclaiming the
copy of the judgment to be a true and correct copy of the lost original document. The question of whether the document is authentic would then be an
issue of fact.'10
The litigant seeking recognition or the party objecting to enforcement
might also have to prove the existence of a particular foreign law dealing
with jurisdiction, notice, or any other potential ground for nonrecognition 0 9
Under section 92.04 of the Florida Statutes, which deals with the introduction
of foreign nation laws into evidence,110 the reviewing court is allowed complete
discretion with regard to the use of parol evidence to show the existence and
effect of the foreign law. The court may, however, demand that a copy of the
foreign law be submitted if the foreign law can be found in a written statute
or code.:""
The provisions of section 92.04 may be relevant when responding to a
defense raised by the party opposing recognition of the foreign judgment. For
example, the party seeking recognition may introduce into evidence the law
of the foreign nation concerning notice if the opposing party attempts to
have the judgment impeached on the ground that he did not have adequate
notice as required under Florida law in such circumstances. 1 12 The opposing
litigant may then demonstrate to the Florida court that although the notice
did not precisely conform with Florida law, it did conform with the law of
3
the foreign nation and did not conflict with Florida's public policy."1
Similarly, a foreign statute may be submitted by the party seeking recognition
to show that the foreign court accords reciprocal recognition to Florida judg-

107. 178 So. 2d at 60.
108.

Id. at 59.

109. See, e.g., Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947) (jurisdiction); Pawley
v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950) (notice).
110. FLA. STAT. §92.04 (1977) states: "Foreign laws.--The existence and the tenor or
effect of all foreign laws may be proven as facts by parol evidence; but if it shall appear
that the law in question is contained in a written statute or code, the court may, in its

discretion, reject any evidence of such law which is not accompanied by a copy of such
code or statute."
111. Id.
112. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
113. Id. at473-75.
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ments."1 4 This is important because Florida law is unclear as to whether redprocity is a precondition to recognition and enforcement of other nations'
judgments. 1 5
In Florida, an action founded on a foreign nation judgment is neither
ancillary to the original suitl nor a proceeding in aid of execution of the
judgment rendered by the foreign court." 7 It is a new and independent
action."28 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.120(e) governs the process of plead114. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 610-11, 33 So. 2d 870, 874 (1947).
115. See text accompanying notes 144-152 infra.
116. Generally, in the case of foreign judgments, the original cause of action is not
merged into the judgment of the foreign court. Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union,
Ltd. 203 So. 2d at 670. The judgment-creditor may choose to assert the original cause of
action de novo. See Kuzer, supra note 66, at 21-22.
117. See Crane v. Nuto, 157 Fla. 613, 26 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1946) (concerning a judgment
from a sister-state). Unlike Florida, some jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 9A U.L.A. 795 (Master ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as the
Enforcement Act] to provide for a speedy procedure to enforce foreign state judgments.
There'are two versions of the Enforcement Act. The first was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws and the American Bar Association in 1948. See
Enforcement Act, 13 U.L.A. 181 (1975). This version has been adopted by five states: Arkansas,
Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska and Oregon. In 1964, the second revised version was approved
by the Commissioners and the American Bar Association. See Enforcement Act, 13 U.L.A.
173 (1975) (revised 1964). It has been adopted in fifteen states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Wisconsin, Washington and Wyoming. Under the Enforcement Act, the original
judgment is registered with the clerk of the court where enforcement is sought. The defendant is then,served with proper notice of the pending proceeding.
The Enforcement Act expressly provides that it is applicable to sister-state judgments.
A foreign judgment "is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state
which' is entitled to full faith and credit' under the Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A.
§3 at 269, 272 (1975). Thus, it seems reasonable that in those states that have adopted
both the Uniform Recognition Act and the Uniform Enforcement Act (Alaska, Illinois,
New York, Oklahoma, Oregon and Washington) a foreign nation judgment might well be
within the registration process of the Enforcement Act. In New York, for example, a plaintiff
can have a foreign judgment enforced by an action on the judgment. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L.Aw
§5302 (McKinney Supp. 1976). There is no need to file a complaint. The judgment debtor is
served with ;a summons, a copy of the motion for summary judgment and the affidavit
filed in support of the summary judgment motion. Id. §3212(b). A foreign judgment in
Illinois, on the other hand, must be authenticated and registered with the clerk of the
court in which enforcement is sought in order to be enforced. Unlike New York, a complaint is then filed seeking enforcement of the final and conclusive foreign judgment and
the defendant is served with a summons and copy of the complaint. The judgment is then
enforced if the respondent does not respond, the response is not made within 30 days, or
the court, after hearing, finds the respondent's defense, set-off, or counterclaim insufficient
to set aside the registration. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77, §§90-95 (Smith-Hurd 1966 & Supp.
1977); ALAsKA STAT. §09.30-100-.270 (1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §5302 (McKinney Supp.
1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§710-726 (1971); WAnt. Rxv. CODE §§6.36.010-.910, 6.40.010-.915
(1976).
118. See Milligan v. Wilson, 107 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2d D.CA. 1958) (action founded on a
sister-state money judgment); von Mehren, supra note 13, at 402. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAWS, §100, Comments (b) & (d) (1971) (general procedure for
enforcing a foreign judgment in most states is an action on a debt, resulting in a new local
judgment subsequently enforced).
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ing a foreign judgment or decree.119 The rule expressly states that when suing
on a foreign judgment a litigant need only allege the actual rendition of the
judgment and attach a copy of the duly authenticated judgment as part of the
complaint. The complaint should disclose the amount due the plaintiff and
should allege that the foreign judgment has not been reversed, modified,
partially paid or satisfied.120 It need not set forth matters showing jurisdiction
of the court of rendition. 12' Lack of jurisdiction over one of the parties or the
subject matter is an affirmative defense which should be presented in the
answer of the party attempting to preclude recognition and enforcement of
the judgment. If, however, the plaintiff chooses to plead the proper jurisdiction of the rendering forum, the defendant may challenge the sufficiency of
22
the allegations by a motion to dismiss.1
The plaintiff's presentation of the foreign judgment is pursuant to the
Florida summary judgment rule, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.5 10,123 a
prima facie showing that no material fact is disputed, 124 and the plaintiff
may promptly move for summary judgment. 12 The burden then shifts to the
opponent to bring forth one of the recognized affirmative defenses to demonstrate a flaw in the original judgment which would prevent recognition or enforcement by the reviewing Florida court. 26 If, in the discretion of the court,
the pleading and other documents attached thereto do not demonstrate the
existence of any material factual dispute, the reviewing court will render a
judgment accordingly.127 The judgment rendered will be in all respects a new
judgment of the reviewing forum rather than an execution of the original
judgment, 28 and whatever modes of enforcement are available for domestic
judgments may be invoked. 129

119. FL.A. R. Civ. P. 1.120(e) (1977) states: "(e) Judgment or Decree. In pleading a judgment or decree of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a
board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decree without setting forth matter
showing jurisdiction to render it."
120. 6 BENDER'S FLA. Fopmas 1270A.04 (Supp. 1978).
121. Futterman v. Gerber, 109 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1959); Milligan v. Wilson, 107
So. 2d 773 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958).
122. Milligan v. Wilson, 107 So. 2d 773, 775 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958); Pacific Mills v. Hillman
Garment, 87 So. 2d 599, 601 (Fla. 1956).
123. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510 (1977) (summary judgments).
124. Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956). An immaterial issue of fact in
dispute will not bar the court from granting a summary judgment motion. See Enes v.
Baker, 58 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1952); Boyer v. Dye, 51 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1951); Mathor v. Lloyd's
Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965).
125. Compare Humphreys v. Jarrell, 104 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958) with Jackson
v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 178 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1965) and Warring v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 105 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958).
126. Manning v. Clark, 71 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1954).
127. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c) (1977). For detailed discussion of summary judgments in
Florida, see H. TRAWICK, supra note 10, at §25-5.
128. See Scoles & Aarnas, supra note 67, at 379-80.
129. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.570 (1977) (pertains to enforcement of final judgment).
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A foreign judgment brought before a Florida court for recognition and enforcement will be presumed valid and conclusive against the parties to the
original action.O The objecting party must bear the burden of coming forth
with a recognized affirmative defense demonstrating a sufficient basis for nonrecognition.' 31 Such defenses include improper jurisdiction, insufficient notice,
public policy, fraud, lack of finality, prior satisfaction of the claim, default
nature of the judgment, a government claim and possibly the lack of
13 2
reciprocity.
The Reciprocity Requirement After Hilton and Ogden
The question of whether the nonexistence of reciprocal recognition
practices in the foreign nation constitutes a sufficient basis for denying recognition of a foreign judgment is the most widely discussed of all issues which
pertain to judgment recognition. 33 Purportedly the reciprocity requirement
was established by the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot.34
In that case a French judgment was denied recognition on the ground that
French courts would not enforce United States judgments without retrial of

130. Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). In Mathor,
the court noted that adjudications of the foreign judiciary "are valid on their face and
entitled to a presumption that the tribunal passing upon the matter had jurisdiction, that
due notice was given, that the proceedings were regular and that the orders are free from
fraud and prejudice." Id. at 72.
131. Id. See also Willson v. Willson, 55 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951); Warren v. Warren, 73
Fla. 764, 75 So. 35 (1917).
132. The Supreme Court's opinion in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), contains a
general statement of the conditions required for recognition. Those conditions have been
incorporated into Florida's common law. See Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 789-90, 75 So.
35, 44 (1917). These conditions are that "ft]here has been opportunity for a full and fair
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular
proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a
system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court or in the system of law under which it is sitting, or fraud
in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this nation
should not allow it full effect ...." 159 U.S. at 202-03.
133. Some states have removed the reciprocity requirement while others have either
adopted specific statutes on the matter, or provided in their judicial pronouncements that
the reciprocity element is a prerequisite to recognition and enforcement of any judgment
from a foreign nation. New York has expressly rejected the rule of reciprocity. Johnson v.
Compagnie Gnrale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926); Cowands v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284, aff'd, 246 N.Y. 603, 159
N.E. 669 (1927). Minnesota has also recently overruled its previous rule on reciprocity.
Nicol v. Tanner, 310 Minn. 68, 78, 256 N.W.2d 796, 801 (1976). For an extensive discussion
on the doctrine of reciprocity, see 2 BEALE, CONFLICt OF LAWS 1381-89 (1935). See also MASS.
ANN. LAws ch. 235, 23A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974 & Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. AtN.
§524:11 (1973), Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952).
134. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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the merits.1 35 Recognition has not been denied solely on lack of reciprocity
in any reported case since Hilton; 36 rather, the reciprocity requirement has
been severely criticized. 13 7 It has been suggested that the Hilton holding did not
turn on the lack of reciprocity alone, but also on allegations of fraud in
securing the original French judgment. 38
Since Hilton, the judicial trend has been away from requiring reciprocity
as a condition for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.'3 9
Generally, courts from states other than Florida have held that the persuasiveness of a judgment may determine its recognition.140 Although constitutional
considerations could preclude the requirements of reciprocity' 4 ' by state
135. Id. at 228.
136. See note 38 supra.
137. See, e.g., Carl, supra note 68, at 684-85; Golomb, supra note 27 at 615, Homburger,
supra note 28, at 381-90; Peterson, supra note 35, at 233-36.
138. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 207-10; Carl, supra note 68, at 685. See also Johnson
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
Hilton was the first and last case on the reciprocity requirement to reach the United
States Supreme Court. The case was decided more than 80 years ago during a period in
history when international interdependence was not fully realized. Because of the number
of years which have elapsed and the changes which have occurred in the world's commercial
community since Hilton, scholars question whether the Supreme Court would uphold the
requirement of reciprocity today. See, e.g., Homburger, supra note 28, at 382-85; Reese, supra
note 28, at 790; von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 48 n.55.
The Hilton decision was made at a time when federal courts could apply federal common
law in diversity of citizenship actions. The United States Supreme Court subsequently ruled
in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that "[t]here is no federal general common
law." Id. at 78. See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra. Furthermore, Hilton's holding, if
it retains validity, is limited in application; reciprocity will be required only when there is
an attempt by a foreign national to enforce an in personam foreign judgment against a
domiciliary of the United States. 159 U.S. at 202-03. In rem judgments, status adjudications,
judgments in favor of or against American domiciliaries and judgments between foreigners
are not within the ambit of Hilton's reciprocity requirement. Id. at 167-68, 170-71. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 411; Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 724;
Reese, supra note 29, at 791-92. State courts generally have not considered themselves
bound by Hilton, although some have adopted its reasoning. See A. EHRENZWulG, CONFLIcr
OF LAWS 165-75 (1962).
139. See, e.g., Nicol v. Tanner, 310 Minn. 68, 78, 256 N.W. 2d 796, 801 (1976). Generally,
courts which have considered cases involving the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have either ignored or rejected the requirement. See von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 12, at 46. But see Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass.
1966).
140. See, e.g., Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. 258, 163 A.2d 493 (1960); Coulborn v. Joseph, 195
Ga. 723, 25 S.E. 2d 576 (1943); Johnson v. Compagnie G~n4rale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y.
381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219
N.Y.S. 284, afl'd, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927). But see Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill. App. 3d
1047, 274 N.E. 2d 157 (1971). The cases which have impliedly held that reciprocity is required may be of little significance, because most were decided prior to Erie's mandate of
the application of state substantive law in federal cases. See also von Mehren & Patterson,
supra note 12, at 47 nn.47 & 48.
141. See text accompanying notes 50-52 supra. See also Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp.
1321 (D. Neb. 1971), afJ'd, 408 U.S. 901 (1972). These cases reasoned that only the federal
government should be involved in foreign affairs and diplomatic relations. See generally
von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12.
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statutes, 142 questions of reciprocity will continue to be governed by individual
4
state substantive laws. M
Response to the reciprocity issue in Florida is not clear. 44 This uncertainty
prevails for three reasons. First, there is no specific statute on the matter.
Second, few Florida cases address the question, and these cases are not recent.
Finally, the discussion of reciprocity is mere dicta in a 1947 Florida supreme
court case that is generally cited as support for the reciprocity requirement. 45
That case, Ogden v. Ogden, 146 involved recognition of a status and alimony
decree rendered by an English court in favor of an English woman and against
a United States domiciliary. The judgment was presented to the Florida
court by the British subject in defense to a subsequent divorce suit initiated
by Mr. Ogden. The Florida court, considering whether to recognize the
English judgment as dispositive of the divorce action, resolved the questions
by applying a rule of international and judicial comity. That rule, according
to the court, was sometimes called the rule of reciprocity, and the court
recognized that "the general rule is that the judgment of a foreign court will
be enforced only when the courts of the jurisdiction where the cause first arose
would afford relief under the same circumstances to the judgments of the
forum."' 4 Based upon expert testimony, the court determined that English
courts would not have given conclusive effect to a similar Florida judgment. S
One commentator has noted that both Hilton and Zschernig "deal with situations in
which reciprocity is thought to serve as an inducement to foreign nations to respect American
rights abroad; both raise the fundamental policy question whether reciprocal arrangements
in private litigation are well suited to attain that goal; both deprive claimants caught by the
reciprocity rule of significant benefits, namely in one case the right to inherit, and in the
other the opportunity to collect on a valid judgment without a new trial; both dispose of
private litigation on grounds which do not consider the merits of the claims and run
counter to basic notions of fairness guarantees to citizens and aliens within and without
the country; and both raise the possibility of an affront to the nation affected by the
court's ruling." Homburger, supra note 28, at 387.
142. MAss. ANN LAws ch. 235, §23A (Michie[Law. Co-op 1974 & Supp. 1977); N.H.
RFv. STAT. ANN. §524:11 (1973). New Hampshire's statute requiring reciprocity was enacted
primarily as a reaction to Quebec's provision that New Hampshire judgments would only
be given the effect accorded to their judgments in New Hampshire.
143. See note 28 supra.
144. But see 19 FLA. Jua., Judgments and Decrees §348 (1958): "The general rule is,
however, that there must be reciprocity; that is, the judgment of a foreign court will be
given force and effect only when the courts of the foreign country where the cause arose
would afford relief under the same circumstances as to the judgments of the forum state"
(footnotes omitted). See also Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 75 So. 35, 45 (1917), which referred to the Hilton rule in dicta.
145. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1951).
See 19 FLA. JuL, Judgments and Decrees §348 (1958).
146, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1951).
147. Id. at 608, 33 So. 2d at 873.
148. The application of the rule was demonstrated by the framing of a question regarding whether or not the English courts would recognize and give conclusive effect to a
Florida judgment against an English subject. Expert testimony, referring to English law
on foreign judgment recognition, demonstrated that a foreign judgment to restore conjugal
rights "would not be given effect in England because it was a final judgment." The court
then found that it similarily would not be required to recognize the non-final judgments
of the English court under the rule of international comity. Id.
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The court's denial of recognition, however, did not turn on the issue of reciprocity or the finality of the English judgment. Instead, the court declined
recognition on due process and jurisdictional grounds, insofar as the English
court had failed
to acquire personal jurisdiction over the United States
149
domiciliary.

Due to the number of years which have elapsed since Odgen's rule of reciprocity and the fact that the holding was based on improper jurisdiction
rather than the absence of reciprocal recognition, the requirement of reciprocity
is uncertain today. 150 In more recent years, the question of reciprocity has not
been directly addressed by Florida courts. In 1975, the Fifth Circuit recognized
the judgment of a Costa Rican court and implied that reciprocal recognition
was required, although the Court did not cite Hilton or Ogden.'51 However,
in two Florida district court cases the question of reciprocal recognition was
never mentioned. 152 Thus, it is uncertain whether Florida law recognizes reciprocity as a defense in an action to enforce a foreign judgment.
Improper Jurisdiction
The defense most frequently presented in a suit for recognition is the
foreign court's lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment in question. 153 However, Florida courts will generally presume the existence of a proper basis for
jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter in litigation. The
party opposing recognition bears the burden of proving the existence of a
material jurisdictional defect. 54
A material jurisdictional defect does not result merely because the require149. Id.
150. See notes 250-52 infra and accompanying text. See also Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d
464, 468 (Fla. 1950) (referring to the doctrine of "judicial comity or reciprocity," quoting
Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. at 608, 33 So. 2d at 874).
151. Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179 (M.D. Fla. 1975), a/'d,
553 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1977). The district court found that "under Costa Rican law a
foreign judgment or decree is entitled to full faith and credit and . . . the court should
give equal treatment to the judgment and decree of the Court of Costa Rica which had
subject matter jurisdiction and properly exercised that jurisdiction in this instance." 392
F. Supp. at 183.
152. Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 203 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1967); Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965).
153. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 48. When considering jurisdiction as a
defense it is important to distinguish in rem status, in rem property, and in personam
judgments. The jurisdictional requirements differ for each category.
154. This rule was recognized by the Third District Court of Appeal in the 1965 case of
Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). The plaintiff-insureds
had initiated an action against the defendant-insurers to recover losses resulting from a confiscation of cargo. The defendants presented the Florida court with the final Bolivian decree
rendered in their favor by the National Jury of Customs of Bolivia. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning
that the foreign judgment was "entitled to a presumption that the tribunals passing upon
the matter had jurisdiction .... " Id. at 72. See also Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895);
In re Malaszenko, 204 F. Supp. 744 (D.N.J. 1962). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this
presumption of validity. See, e.g., Gaylord v. Gaylord, 45 So. 2d 507, 510 (Fla. 1950); Schwartz
v. Schwartz, 143 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962).
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ments of Florida law are not met.155 The Florida view with respect to proper
jurisdiction in foreign status adjudications is that the judgment will be recognized as long as there has been sufficient notice and an opportunity to be
heard and at least one of the parties was domiciled in the foreign nation at
the time the decree was rendered. Thus, in Pawley v. Pawley 56 a divorce
decree to the husband awarded by a Cuban court was presented as a conclusive defense to the wife's Florida action for alimony. The former husband
claimed that the Cuban judgment was recognizable under the state's doctrine
of international comity and that the ex-wife should be barred from relitigating
the matter. The wife had not voluntarily appeared in the foreign divorce proceeding and had not been served with process within the jurisdiction of the
adjudicating Cuban tribunal.'157 The Cuban court had claimed jurisdiction
through substituted service that was valid under Cuban law but not under
Florida law. 58 The wife in the Florida action argued that the Cuban judgment should not be recognized as a defense because of this material jurisdictional defect. 59

The Pawley court conclusively recognized the Cuban divorce decree as
to the defendant's marital status. In addressing the issue of whether the
difference between the jurisdictional laws of Florida and the foreign nation
would result in nonrecognition of a judgment rendered in full compliance with
the laws of the judgment-rendering nation.I60 However, the court did not foreclose the right to question the propriety of the alimony issue. The court based
its recognition of foreign jurisdiction on the nature of the action. In an in
personam judgment for alimony, unlike in status adjudication, proper jurisdiction depends upon legally binding personal service. 161 According to the
155. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950), petition denied, 47 So. 2d 546, cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1951). But see Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 203
So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967); Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972).
Article 7 of the Hague Convention states that recognition may not be denied solely because the law applied by the adjudicating court was not the law which would have been
applied by the reviewing court. See Hague Convention, supra note 81, at 363. See, e.g.,
Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d 431 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972). For a discussion of due
process as it relates to jurisdiction of foreign courts, see Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 739.
Uncertainty exists as to the result if jurisdiction were acquired in accordance with the
law of the reviewing forum while the adjudicating court purported to act pursuant to a
jurisdictional basis considered unsatisfactory by the reviewing forum. tCf. Supplementary
Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 81, art. 2 (providing that recognition would,
in such cases, be discretionary).
156. 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950), petition denied, 47 So. 2d 546, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866
(1951).
157. 46 So. 2d at 467. The Cuban divorce action was brought by the husband on the
grounds of desertion. The defendant wife had been a Florida resident for several years
prior to the action. Id. at 467, 471 & n.1.
158. Id. at 468, 473. Although the defendant wife received only constructive notice in
Cuba, she was aware of the action but chose to ignore it. Id. at 468.
159. Id. at 467.
160. Id. at 472.
161. Id. at 468. The court relied on United States Supreme Court opinions, stating
that: "[I]n a divorce action where legally binding personal service had not been had upon
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Pawley court, "[i]t is only in those cases wherein all parties litigant were personally (actually or by legally sufficient personal service of process) before the
court that all justiciable controversies may be said to have been conclusively
determined."162

Foreign judgments are also denied conclusive effect in Florida if the foreign
court exercised improper jurisdiction over the subject matter. For example,
Florida recognizes that jurisdiction is improper when a judgment was rendered
by a tribunal of a nation in which neither party was domiciled. In Schwartz v.
the defendant wife and where she had not voluntarily appeared, her right to the enforcement
of a prior award of separate maintenance was not destroyed." Id. at 472. The court reasoned
that the defendant wife had not had her day in court or an opportunity to be heard upon
the subject of her right to alimony. The court found that the personal obligation of the
husband to support his wife survived the adjudication of the marital status. Id. at 472-73.
Upon dismissal of the wife's action for separate maintenance, the court suggested the proper
action to be a suit for divorce on the statutory grounds of a spouse's prior foreign divorce
and a request for relief by way of support or alimony. Id. at 474-75.
In an in personam alimony proceeding, proper jurisdiction must be demonstrated to
be in accordance with Florida law. See Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947);
Jackson v. Stelco Employee's Credit Union, Ltd., 203 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1967). In
Ogden the court did not recognize an English decree which had restored the conjugal rights
of a United States domiciliary's English wife. The husband had been served with notice
while in New York. He appeared before the English court only for the purpose of contesting
the question of jurisdiction over his person. The Florida court found this basis of jurisdiction to be insufficient, declaring that "jurisdiction of the parties is the first prerequisite to a
valid judgment in this country and it makes no difference whether the parties are lounge
lizards or the highest ranking citizens." 159 Fla. at 610-11, 33 So. 2d at 874. Recognition
was denied, notwithstanding a showing that pursuant to English law there had been proper
jurisdiction. The court concluded that the English law of jurisdiction and due process were
"so different from what we understand it to be in this country, and what our law requires
to support it, that a judgment secured there in a case like this would not be recognized
and enforced in Florida on the basis of international comity." Id.
162. 46 So. 2d at 473. It may be difficult to predict how flexible the Florida courts will
be in recognizing status judgments from other nations. The Pawley court found that "Mrs.
Pawley knew of the pending of the divorce action for she was given personal notice of the
existence of the Cuban divorce suit in two separate occasions," and that "[slubstituted service
conformable to the law of Cuba was had upon Mrs. Pawley." 46 So. 2d at 467. It is
questionable what the court would have done if the law of the foreign nation did not even
require substituted service in order to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant. For example,
article 14 of the French Civil Code gives French courts in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant whenever the plaintiff in the action is a French national. C. civ. art. 14 (translated
in A. voN MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS
oN CONFLicr OF LAWS 668 (1965)), Similarly, article 23 of the West German Code of Civil Procedure allows the court to adjudicate a matter based solely on the location of any property
belonging to the nonresident defendant within the court's jurisdiction. German courts are
authorized to take in personam jurisdiction over the defendant even when the asset had no
relationship or minimal connection with the action initiated. ZPO §23 (1877) (translated in A.
VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra, at 673-74). This basis of jurisdiction is similar to our
quasi-in-rem jurisdictional basis except that, unlike the United States, a judgment will
not be limited to the property located within the jurisdiction. The cause of action need
not have any relation to the property attached as the jurisdictional basis. In these situations
it would appear that even if a judgment was rendered in conformance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the foreign nation, such a jurisdictional basis would be so inimical to
Florida law and public policy that recognition might be denied. See text accompanying
notes 197-205 infra.
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Schwartz,a 3 the appellate court denied recognition to a Mexican divorce decree
which incorporated a separation agreement procured ex parte when neither
party was a Mexican domiciliary.'6 Florida's recognition of status decrees will
generally be limited to situations where at least one spouse was domiciled in
the foreign court's jurisdiction. 5 It is uncertain whether recognition of status
will be accorded where both parties were subject to the court's in personan
66
jurisdiction, as in the case of "one-day" consent divorces.
Proper jurisdiction in other types of in rem judgments depends upon the
18
the district
location of the res.' 7 In Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M1 V Lucy,
court considered an action brought by a Florida plaintiff to foreclose maritime
liens for supplies furnished to a vessel while anchored in a Florida port. The
plaintiffs alleged that when the vessel was later confiscated and sold by the
Costa Rican government pursuant to a mortgage foreclosure, they were denied
due process rights and were not bound by the decree ordering foreclosure and
sale. The district court concluded that since the action was in rem and all procedural requirements were in accordance with Costa Rican law, the decree
would be "binding on the entire world."' 69 The court noted that in rem jurisdiction exists when the res is located within the jurisdiction and control of the
courtYo9 Because the foreign court had exercised proper jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Florida court held that the seizure of the "thing itself"
was constructive notice sufficient to comply with due process requirements. "1
163. 143 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1962).
164. Citing Pawley, the Schwartz court declared that "to actuate the doctrine of judicial
comity a foreign judgment must partake of the elements which would support it if pro"Id. at 902.
cured in this country ....
165. See, e.g., Wilson v. Willson, 55 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 143
So. 2d at 902. See also von 'Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11, at 1638.
The rationale behind this general rule is that because the marriage itself is the "thing"
which follows the domicile of the parties, the court will have the power to adjudicate the
status of the parties when the rest is within its territorial limits. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 50 n.66 (citing Litvaitis v. Litvaitis, 162 Conn. 540, 295 A.2d 519 (1972)).
166. Compare von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 50-51 (recognition will be
limited to situations in which at least one spouse was domiciled within the court's jurisdiction or both parties were subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the court) with Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 732 (jurisdiction over the party will not extend if the defendant
has appeared only to contest jurisdiction). See also Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. at 607-09, 33
So. 2d at 873; Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. §5(a)(2), at 269, 275 (1975). Although one
of the parties is domiciled in the foreign nation at the time the judgment is rendered, the
foreign country must have personal jurisdiction in compliance with Florida law to render
an in personam judgment against the other party. See note 164 supra.
167. Neither the Uniform Recognition Act, see notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text;
the European Convention, see note 79 supra; nor the United Kingdom-United States Convention, see note 82 supra and accompanying text, includes a provision dealing with jurisdiction in quasi-in-rem actions. However, under provisions 1 and 4 of the Supplementary
Protocol to the Hague Convention, supra note 81, there may be a proper jurisdictional basis
to render a quasi-in-rem judgment when the action is to assert a proprietary interest in the
property attached. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
168. 392 F. Supp. 179 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
169. Id. at 181.
170. Id. at 182. See also REnSATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFucr OF LAWS §§56-65 (1971).
171. 392 F. Supp. at 181 (citing E. BENEDICT, Tim AmIUCAN ADMnALTY, ITS JU sDIxnON
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Although Florida courts have provided flexible jurisdictional standards for
adjudicating foreign status and other in rem actions, these standards preclude
recognition when the jurisdiction and due process laws of the adjudicating
nation are inimical to Florida's public policy. 1" 2 Recognition has been denied
to in personam judgments when the defendant was not served with process,
either personally or through an authorized agent, within the jurisdiction of
the adjudicating forum." 3 While this ground for denying recognition of in
personam judgments has been accepted by some United States courts, 7 4 others
have adopted increasingly expansive jurisdictional concepts based on "longarm" contacts or relationships with the adjudicating nation. These courts hold
that such contacts make it fair and reasonable to compel the defendant's attendance .'7 Nevertheless, "long-arm" jurisdiction has not been well received
PRACTICE §231 (7th ed. 1950). The court also cited the 1929 Fifth Circuit case of Zimmern
Coal Co. v. Coal Trading Ass'n of Rotterdam, 30 F.2d 933, 934 (5th Cir. 1929), in which,
like Atlantic Ship Supply, the court found that the seizure would be "sufficient to impart
notice" when an action is in rem.
172. See text accompanying notes 197-205 supra.
173. The court in Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 203 So. 2d 669 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1967) denied recognition to an in personam money judgment rendered by a
Canadian court without proper personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The judgment had
been rendered in Canada against the Florida resident, although the defendant had not
consented to the action by voluntary appearance and had not been properly served within
the jurisdiction of the Canadian court. Jurisdiction was obtained by serving the "papers"
upon the Florida defendants in Florida. The defendants asserted the affirmative defense that
the Canadian court lacked in personam jurisdiction to enter the money judgment against
them. The defense was dispositive of the action. The court noted that "a judgment of a
foreign country entered under such circumstances did not comport with American ideals
relating to 'due process' and should not be recognized in Florida under rules of comity."
Id. at 670. See also Markham v. Nisbet, 60 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1952); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.
2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
174. See, e.g., Banco Minero v. Ross, 138 S.W. 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911), afl'd, 106 Tex.
522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915). See Carl, supra note 68, at 683 n.20. See also H. GOODRICH, CONFLiCT
OF LAWS §§24-29 (3d ed. 1949). The Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. §4(a)(2), at 269,
273 (1975), expressly provides that money judgments obtained when the foreign court has
not acquired jurisdiction over the defendant's person will not be enforceable.
175. See, e.g., Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969); Rosentiel v. Rosentiel, 16
N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971 (1966); von
Mehren, supra note 13, at 412 n.53 and cases cited therein. These expansive concepts of
"long-arm" jurisdiction have been incorporated into the Uniform Recognition Act. See text
accompanying notes 74-75 supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§27-39 (1971).
However, recognition of an in personam judgment will probably not extend if the judgment is rendered pursuant to an exorbitant jurisdictional basis. For example, in a 1968
paternity suit, an Austrian court acquired in personam jurisdiction over Jean Claude Killy
by ordering the seizure of underwear left behind by the skier in an Austrian hotel. Si
NEws INT'L, Feb. 3, 1968, at 1. The pertinent provision of the Austrian Code vests in personam
jurisdiction over any person with assets of any value in Austria. Nadelmann, supra note 70,
at 261. In France, article 14 of the Civil Code provides for in personam jurisdiction over any
person if the plaintiff is a French national. See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 413 n.57.
Under article 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure, West Germany, like Austria, is granted
general jurisdiction over a person having any property located within that court's jurisdiction. Id. See note 162 supra. See also Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 739 n.37 (citing DUNCAN &
DYKES, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL JURISDICTION 71-103 (1911)
(Scottish law permits the court to
AND
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by Florida courts adjudicating foreign judgments against local domiciliaries.Y86
Insufficient Notice
The applicable standards for determining the adequacy of notice in the
international context are similar to the standards applied in domestic proceedings.177 This determination focuses on whether sufficient notice was received
rather than whether notice was given in accordance with the laws of the foreign
nation. 78 Insufficient notice exists not only when no notice is given but also
when actual notice is given but does not adequately appraise the defendant of
the nature or time of the proceeding or of the issues to be litigated.179 In
Florida, improper notice which is shown to have resulted in denial of the defendant's opportunity to be heard may be grounds for nonrecognition or non-

enforcement of the foreign judgment'8 0
The notice required for an in rem action differs from that required for an

in personam action. Personal notice is required for in rem actions; however,
personal service is not necessary.' 8 ' Substituted service may provide adequate

notice, particularly when such service is in accordance with the law of the
foreign tribunal and the manner of service is not contrary to the law and
public policy of the state.28 2 Seizure of the res will sufficiently impart notice,' 83
exercise in personam jurisdiction by merely attaching an asset of the person located within
the court's jurisdiction). Judgments obtained under these exorbitant jurisdictional bases will
probably be denied recognition because they violate the state's public policy against improper jurisdiction over the United States domiciliary.
176. See Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 203 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1967). See note 173 supra. For the view under the Uniform Recognition Act, see
notes 74-75 supra and accompanying text.
177. See Reese, supranote 28, at 789 n.36 and cases cited therein.
178. Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 637, 21 So. 2d 141, 142 (1945).
179. Cf. Bank of Montreal v. Kough, 430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (sufficient notice
includes consideration of the amount of time allotted to the defendant to enter an appearance); Julen v. Larsen, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Dist. CL App. 1972) (insufficient notice if complaint is in a language unknown to the party sought to be notified);
Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 274 N.E.2d 157 (1971) (no hearing date); Fantony v.
Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 122 A.2d 593 (1956) (inadequate appraisal of issues to be litigated).
180. Parker v. Parker, 111 Fla. 635, 637, 21 So. 2d 141, 142 (1945). This requirement is
incorporated in the Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. §4(b), at 269, 273-74, (1975), which
provides that a foreign judgment "need not be recognized" if it is shown either that the
defendant had no notice or that the notice did not allow him sufficient time to defend the
action. Although this provision is discretionary, case law indicates that recognition will not
be granted when the defendant did not have either actual or proper notice. See In re Estate
of Paramythotis, 15 Misc. 2d 133, 181 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Banco Minero v. Ross,
106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915). See also Julen v. Larsen, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (Dist. App. 1972); Hager v. Hager, 1 Il. App. 3d 1047, 274 N.E2.d 157 (1971).
181. See text accompanying notes 167-171 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 156-162 supra, 197-205 infra. In situations in which
sufficient notice is provided although not mandated, the difference in notice laws between
the two jurisdictions will not in itself lead to nonrecognition. See von Mehren & Trautman,
supra note 11, at 1663. But see Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 18-19 a1928) (Brandeis,
Holmes, and Stone, J.J., dissenting) (sister-state judgment denied recognition); Boivin v.
Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (denied recognition to Canadian judgment
by applying -Wuchter because service by publication, as required by foreign law, was in-
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although commentators contend that this is insufficient if a judgment is entered
against a party whose interests were known to the foreign court but who was
deliberately not notified.1s 4
The degree of notice imparted in an in personam action is more strictly
scrutinized and lacks the flexibility permitted in an in rem adjudication. If the
defendant is not served personally within the jurisdiction and does not submit
voluntarily to the foreign court's jurisdiction, the in personam judgment will
not be recognized despite a showing of personal notice through substituted
service in accordance with the foreign law.1s 5
ForeignLaw and Procedure
Offensive to NaturalJustice and PublicPolicy
The judgment may be denied recognition 86 if the challenging party can
show that the law and procedure upon which the foreign court based its findings of fact were so arbitrary and capricious as to offend a United States
court's sense of "natural justice."'187 In essence, this means that the foreign
country in which the judgment was rendered must have an impartial, civilized
system of jurisprudence. 88 The practical utility of this defense is minimal
because most judgments for which execution is sought are rendered in nations
with well-developed jurisprudential systems.'8 9
sufficient to impart notice although actual notice was received by mail); Ogden v. Ogden
159 Fla. at 611-13, 33 So. 2d at 875 (constructive notice through substituted service is insufficient to acquire jurisdiction over a United States domiciliary in an action for divorce
and alimony).
183. In Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
afj'd, 553 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1977), capture of the res was found to be sufficient to impart
proper notice even though there had never been personal or other adequate substitute service
to provide the affected party with notice of the pending sale. See also Zimmern Coal Co. v.
Coal Trading Ass'n, 30 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1929). But cf. China Mutual Ins. Co. v. Force, 142
N.Y. 90, 36 N.E. 874 (1874) (notice of distribution of proceeds from the sale of salvage was
required if the persons whose interest were affected were known, even though the actual
order to sell was proper without notice).
184. See Peterson, supra note 35, at 228; von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 58.
185. See notes 156-162 supra and accompanying text.
186. See Golomb, supra note 27, at 626; Reese, supra note 28, at 795-96.
187. This precise term was used by the English courts. See, e.g., Robinson v. Fenner,
3 L.J.K.B. 835, 842-43 (1913). The concept was later adopted by American states under a
variety of labels. See, e.g., Coulborn v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 733, 25 S.E.2d 576, 581 (1943)
(fundamental concepts of justice); Sawyer v. Maine Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 12 Mass. 291,
295 (1815) ("substantial requisite of judicial inquiry").
188. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 202; Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71,
72 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965). See also Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla. 764, 75 So. 35 (1917). See note

234 infra.
189. See Golomb, supra note 27, at 626; von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 59
n.116. But see Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971). In denying recognition
to an East German judgment, the court considered a possible violation of "natural justice"
because adjudications were not made by impartial arbiters. The federal district court
characterized the East German court as one which orients its judgments "according to the
wishes of the leaders of the socialist state" rather than as "an independent judiciary of the
type found in the United States." 293 F. Supp. at 906. Cf. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429
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Existence of the "natural justice" concept as a valid defense can be traced
to Hilton v. Guyot.190 The Hilton court recognized that the presence of
"natural justice" was a prerequisite to the enforcement of a foreign judgment
in this nation. The majority declared that the judgment must have been
rendered "upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance . . . and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial
administration of justice... ."91
This defense would probably be recognized in Florida, although it has
not been expressly invoked in this state. Its validity is indicated in two Florida
cases. In Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters9 2 the court granted recognition to a
Bolivian customs judgment, reasoning that Bolivia was a "sovereign government with a civilized jurisprudence and laws regulating its custom matters." 198
Similarly, the court in Parkerv. Parker94 noted that foreign judgments would
not be recognized if the foreign legal system contained no counterparts of good
faith and due process. 95 A combined reading of these cases suggests that due
process is at the heart of Florida's concept of "civilized jurisprudence" and
"natural justice."'' 96
In Florida, a foreign court decree will not be given effect under the rule of
international and judicial comity if the objecting party demonstrates that
recognition of the judgment would be "subversive of any Florida policy or
interest."'' 9 7 A judgment is said to be adverse to public policy if the initial proceeding was conducted in a manner or based on a cause of action so repugnant
(1968) (criticism of foreign nation laws by individual states interferes with foreign diplo-

matic relations).
190. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
191. Id. at 202.
192. 174 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965).
193. Id. at 72.
194. 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141 (1945).
195. According to the court, such judgments offend "the very bedrock on which our
system of jurisprudence is constructed." Id. at 637, 21 So. 2d at 141. In addition, Parker
demands that the judgment be rendered in "a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice between citizens of its own country and those of other

countries .... " Id. at 637, 21 So. 2d at 142.
196. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d at 467. In Banco Minero v. Ross; 138 S.W. 224 ('ex.
Civ. App. 1911), af'd, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915), the Texas Supreme Court dealt
with a situation in which a judgment had been rendered after summary proceedings denying

the defendant a hearing and the subsequent denial of his appeal for failure to have sufficient
documentary stamps on his papers. The court held that a judgment rendered under such a

system of jurisprudence was inimical to this nation's fundamental concepts of due process
and would not be recognizable. Id. at 536-37, 172 S.W. at 714-15.
197. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 610, 33 So. 2d 870, 874 (1947); Pawley v. Pawley,

46 So. 2d at 469. This defense is foreclosed as a matter of constitutional law in interstate
cases. See also Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). But see REsrATMENT (SFcOND) OF
CONFUCr oF LAws §117, Comment c (1971), which provides an exception to the constitu-

tional obligation when dealing with foreign nation judgments. The standard is generally

said to be that of repugnancy to fundamental notions of decency and justice in the state
where enforcement is sought. Section (4)(b)(3) of the Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A.
269, 274 (1975), includes the provision that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if
in the discretion of the reviewing court the judgment was based on a claim contrary to the
state's public policy.
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to the laws of the state that recognition of the judgment would be subversive
to basic concepts of fairness. 98 Accordingly, Florida courts will refuse to
recognize an adjudication based on a proceeding which failed to meet basic
requirements of due process and fairness, contained elements of bad faith, or
otherwise offended Florida law and policy.
Differences in law and practice of a foreign country from those of the rel 9
viewing forum do not mandate violations of Florida law and policy. Case
law from other jurisdictions indicates that recognition will not be denied
automatically because, for example, the foreign country's rules of evidence
20 0
procedural rights differ, 20 1 or the foreign
are contrary to those of the state,

country creates presumptions not in harmony with those of the reviewing
forum.2 0 2 In addition, recognition might be granted although administrative

procedures did not afford the defendant a hearing but provided instead for
subsequent judicial review. 20 3 Recognition may also be accorded if the choice
of law rules of the foreign state led to the application of a body of law which
would not have been applied by the reviewing forum. 20 4 Conversely, Florida
courts will deny recognition to a decree as a matter of public policy if the
defendant has not been given a fair trial due to improper service 6r extrinsic
205

fraud.

Judgment Procured by Fraud
Fraud in procuring a foreign judgment has been acknowledged as another
198. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d at 467. Examples of public policy violations are suits
based on penal or fiscal laws, on local policy regulations, or upon actions repugnant to the

public policy of the recognizing forum. See, e.g., DeBrimint v. Penniman, 7 F. Gas. 309
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 3,715) (French court order to support son-in-law was unenforceable
as contrary to public policy); Kordoski v. Belanger, 52 R.I. 268, 160 A. 205 (1932) (local

character of judgment dealing with support order made it unenforceable); Rostron v.
Rostron, 49 R.I. 292, 142 A. 162 (1928) (penal judgment inconclusive).
199. See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 61-62 nn. 139-140 & 143-44. See also
Naporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1958) (foreign judgment was enforced notwithstanding the nonexistence of such claim in New York).
200. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 204-05; Warren v. Warren 73 Fla. 764, 791-92, 75 So.
35, 44-45 (1917); Reese, supra note 28, at 795.
201.
202.

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 204.
See, e.g., Newton v. Hunt, 59 Misc. 633, 112 N.Y.S. 573 (Sup. Ct. 1908), modified,

134 App. Div. 325, 119 N.Y.S. 3 (1909).
203. See, e.g., Regierungspraesident Land Nordrhein-Westfalin v. Rosenthal, 17 App.
Div. 2d 145, 232 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1962).
204. See, e.g., Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 279, 265 N.E,2d 739, 744, 317

N.Y.S.2d 315, 322 (1970). Interestingly, recognition was granted by a New York court to a
foreign judgment based on a cause of action expressly repealed by statute in the reviewing
state. Naporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1958). The New York court

reasoned that the statute covered only acts committed within the jurisdiction. Accordingly,
when such acts were committed in another nation, the repealing statute did not evince a

strong public policy reason to foreclose enforcement of the foreign nation judgment. In
contrast, the New York appellate court denied recognition to a foreign nation judgment

that contravened a local policy disallowing actions against deceased persons. In re Estate of
Davis, 31 Misc. 2d 270, 219 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1961), af'd, 16 App. Div. 2d 683, 227

N.Y.S.2d 894 (1962).
205. See, e.g., Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141 (1945).
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defense against its recognition and enforcement. 2 6 Fraud can exist in either
extrinsic or intrinsic form.20 7 Extrinsic fraud includes acts which occur outside the proceeding itself and prevent the unsuccessful party from having a
fair trial. For example, extrinsic fraud is demonstrated when the prevailing
party in the original action willfully prevented the unsuccessful party from
participating in the foreign proceeding.208 Intrinsic fraud consists of acts which
occur in the proceeding before the foreign court and are material in determining the initial outcome. Such acts include perjury, misrepresentations and the
20 9
use of forged evidence or unauthenticated documents.
The landmark case of Hilton v. Guyot2 ° laid the foundation for the validity
of the fraud defense. The American defendant in Hilton challenged the
foreign decree's enforceability by alleging that the French creditor had procured the judgment by fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the amount
of his claims. According to the court, these misrepresentations constituted intrinsic fraud3 1 The Court noted that extrinsic fraud was usually required to
defeat recognition or to impeach a domestic judgment. However, because the
case was not decided on the issue of fraud, the question of whether intrinsic
fraud would be sufficient to impeach a judgment from abroad was left un2
answered.21
The Supreme Court of Florida confronted a judgment allegedly procured
by extrinsic fraud in Parkerv. Parker. The divorce decree presented for defensive recognition had been awarded to the husband by a Cuban court while
his wife was in the United States. The husband had advised the foreign court
that proper service of the divorce petition was impossible because his wife's
whereabouts were unknown to him. Consequently, the Cuban court allowed
service by publication. It was learned later that Mr. Parker did know the location of his spouse throughout the proceeding. It was not until after the final
decree had been entered and upon her return to the island that Mrs. Parker

206. See, e.g., Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 P. 542
(1915). See also §4(b)(2) of the Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 269, 273 (Supp. 1977);
United Kingdom-United States Convention, Oct. 26, 1976, art. 7(b) (reprinted in 16 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 71 (1977)). But see Cardy v. Cardy, 23 App. Div. 2d 117, 258 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1965).
207. See Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 743-44; Equitable Relief Against an Award Obtained
by Perjury: The Extrinsic-IntrinsicFraud Distinction,36 ILL. L. Rr v. 894, 895 (1941).

208. Tamimi v. Tamimi, 38 App. Div. 2d 197, 328 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1972). See also von
Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 60 nn.123-125 and. cases cited therein; Zaphiriou,
supra note 14, at 743-44.
209. See Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 743.
210. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
211. 159 U.S. at 207-10.
212. Id. See Reese, supra note 28, at 794 & n.59; Accord, McKay v. McAlexander, 268
F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1959); Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, Ltd., 33 F.2d 667 (1st Cir. 1929);
Lucas v. Lucas, 232 F. Supp. 466, 467-68 (D. Canal Zone 1964); Harges v. Harges, 46 Misc.
2d 994, 261 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 727. One commentator
has noted: "American courts will ordinarily enforce a foreign judgment where the fraud
alleged is deemed intrinsic, i.e., where the [foreign] court had the opportunity to pass upon
it." Golomb, supra note 27, at 626.
213. 155 Fla. 636, 21 So. 2d 141 (1945).
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learned of her divorced status.214 Reasoning that the decree had not been
215
the Florida court denied
obtained through "good faith and due process,"
recognition to the Cuban decree. Thus, Parker illustrates216that a foreign judgment procured by extrinsic fraud will not be recognized.
Nonfinality of the Decree
All jurisdictions allow a party to plead lack of finality of a foreign judg21 7
A final
ment as a defense to a petition for recognition of the judgment.
of the
disposes
judgment has been defined as one which "determines and
whole merits of the cause before the Court by declaring that the plaintiff either
is or is not entitled to recover by the remedy chosen, or completely and
finally disposes of a branch of the cause which may be separate and distinct
from other parts thereof." 2181 In determining whether a judgment is final, the
reviewing court will look to the law of the rendering forum to ensure that a
decree will not be accorded greater effect in the reviewing jurisdiction than
219
it would have been given by the rendering court.
Nonfinality may preclude recognition if the foreign decree is either interlocutory or modifiable.2 20 Judgments which are provisional, temporary, or sub2 2
ject to further judicial consideration are considered interlocutory. 1 Modifiable
judgments, which include judgments for maintenance, custody, or alimony,
2 22
If a decree is not
may be altered upon a showing of changed circumstances.
in its discretion,
may,
court
reviewing
final because it is subject to appeal, the
until the appeal
proceeding
in
the
either enforce the judgment or permit a stay
222
The general
entered.
is
is heard by the foreign court and a final judgment
214. Id. at 636, 21 So. 2d at 141. It was shown that Mr. Parker had been sending his
wife remittances while he was in Cuba and she in the United States. Id.
215. Id. at 637, 21 So. 2d at 141.
216. Jurisdictions other than Florida have also recognized that the presence of extrinsic
fraud will impeach a foreign judgment. See cases cited in note 212 supra.
217. See Ogden v. Ogden, 155 Fla. at 609, 33 So. 2d at 874.
218. Irving Trust Co. v. Kaplan, 155 Fla. 120, 125, 20 So. 2d 351, 354 (1944).
219. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 728; Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at 747. See also
Ramm v. Ramm, 34 App. Div. 2d 667, 310 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1970), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 892, 271
N.E.2d 558, 322 N.Y.S.2d 726 (1971). But see Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, Sociedad
Nononima v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 218 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1963), af'd, 335
F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964). See generally Gutteridge, Reciprocity in Regard to Foreign Judgments, 13 BPuT. Y.B. INT'L 49 (1932).
220. See, e.g., In re Cleland's Estate, 119 Cal. App. 2d 18, 258 P.2d 1097 (1953); Willson v.
Willson, 55 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1951); In re Rutherford, 182 Misc. 1019, 46 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup.
Ct. 1944). See also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 69; Zaphiriou, supra note 14, at
747.
221. von Mehren 9: Patterson, supra note 12, at 69.
222. Willson v. Willson, 55 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1951). Section 1(2) of the Uniform
Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 269, 271 (1975), precludes the recognition of "a judgment for
support in matrimonial or family matters."
223. Compare Algazy v. Algazy, 135 N.Y.S.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1954), afJ'd, 285 App. Div. 2d
1140, 142 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1955) (New York court entertained action while French alimony
proceeding was pending), with Oakland Truck Sales, Inc. v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 902
(Ct. Cl. 1957) (action stayed pending final adjudication of foreign proceeding). Section (2)
of the Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 269, 271 (1975), provides for recognition and en-
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rule dealing with modifiable judgments focuses on the conditions necessary for
modification by the foreign court. Such a judgment may be modified by the
reviewing court to the extent that the rendering court could modify it, and
the judgment be enforced to the extent that it is shown to be final and con2
clusive under the laws of the rendering forum.2 4
PriorSatisfaction of the Judgment
The general rule applicable to interstate judgments regarding payment
or other discharge of debt in accordance with the decree is also applicable in
the international context. 25 The rule states that if a judgment is entered in
one state, reduced to judgment in a second state, and subsequently satisfied in
either state, such satisfaction is a conclusive defense to an attempt to enforce
the same claim in the courts of the other state. In the international context
there is an added variable of varying national currencies and fluctuations in
currency exchange rates which may affect the application of this defense of
"satisfaction of judgment." Florida follows the rule thai the measure of a
foreign money judgment presented to a court for recognition and execution
is equal to the value in United States dollars of the amount awarded by the
foreign court.228 However, the applicable rate of exchange could be the rate
when suit was filed in Florida, when the Florida court recognized the foreign
judgment, 227 or when the foreign court granted the initial award to the
creditor.
Although no Florida case has dealt with this alternative exchange date
forcement of money judgments which are "final and conclusive and enforceable where
rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or ... [the judgment] is subject to
appeal." In addition, §6 of the Uniform Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. at 276, permits a stay
of the enforcement procedings pending final adjudication by the foreign court.
224. Willson v. Willson, 55 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1951). See also Herczog v. Herczog, 180
Cal. App. 2d 318, 9 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1960); von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 48; von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11, at 1657-58. Cf. RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLrT oF
LAws §109, Comment d (1971) (respondent given the same opportunity to relitigate as
would have been afforded by the original court).
When confronted with two inconsistent foreign judgments, a court will apply the general
rule applicable to sister-state judgments. The later judgment will prevail unless shown to
be void by any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. See, e.g., Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. 258,
163 A.2d 493 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961); RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONmar oF
LAws §114 (1971); von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 70 nn. 185-186 and cases cited
therein. See generally Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-InTime Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARv. L. REv. 798 (1969).
225. See Reese, supra note 28,,at 798-99.
226. Jackson v. Stelco Employees' Credit Union, Ltd., 178 So. 2d at 60. In addition, courts
have generally held that interest accrued from the date of the initial foreign judgment may
be awarded. See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1 (SM.
N.Y. 1973).
227. See, e.g., RESrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLar OF LAws §101, Comment d (1971);
Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law: A Historical Inventory and a
Prospectus,42 IowA L. R v. 155 (1957); von Mehren &Patterson, supra note 12, at 76.
228. See generally Jones, The Spurious Judgment Day Rule for Converting Foreign
Currency into Dollars: What Suit is Brought Upon an Obligation Governed by Foreign
Law, 3 I T'L LAw. 277 (1969).
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problem, a 1928 New York case addressed the issue. In In re James' Will, 229

the court was faced with a conversion of French francs to dollars. Originally,
the judgment was rendered for the creditor in New York for the amount of
65,133.25 dollars. This judgment was then taken before the French court for
recognition and was reduced to a judgment for 2,300,000 francs. 2

30

The French

court set the exchange rate as of the date the American judgment was presented for recognition. When the amount awarded by the French court was
finally paid, the francs vis-At-vis the dollar had been greatly devalued, and
the creditor received an amount much less than that which had been awarded
by the New York court. The creditor returned to the New York courts, requesting that he be paid the difference between the United States dollar judgment and the judgment of the French court.2 31 In a 5-4 decision, the court

recognized the defense of total discharge and full payment of the judgment.
It was shown, however, that the creditor, when presenting the judgment for
enforcement in France, requested that the exchange date be that of commencement of the suit rather than the date of actual payment. 232
Default Judgments
Although the question has come before other courts, 233 there is no Florida
case specifically addressing the treatment to be accorded to foreign nation default judgments.2 3 4 Generally, the rule applicable to interstate judgments has
been extended to international adjudications. In the interstate context, a default judgment rendered by a court of a sister state will be regarded as conclusive on the merits and will be enforced, unless the party opposing its
recognition produces substantial evidence showing grounds for nonrecognition,
such as lack of jurisdiction or denial of fundamental due process.23 5 In the
229.

248 N.Y. 1, 161 N.E. 201 (1928).

230. Id. at 2, 161 N.E. at 202.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. British Midland Airways, Ltd. v. International Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.
1974). Action was initiated to enforce a default judgment obtained in England. In recognizing the foreign judgment, the Ninth Circuit stated: "We agree in this case with the Third
Circuit's view, stated in a similar British default case, that 'English procedure comports
with our standards of due process.' It has long been the law that unless a foreign country's
judgments are the result of outrageous departures from our own notions of 'civilized jurisprudence,' comity should not be refused." Id. at 871 (citing Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
234. The Florida supreme court, however, has considered default-type judgments, although that term has not been employed. In Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141
(1945), recognition was denied a divorce judgment entered by a Cuban court when the
defendant wife did not respond. The court never discussed the default-nature of the
judgment. Nevertheless, the court's denial of recognition indicated that default judgments
will not be recognized, even defensively, if there was a major defect, such as improper
notice or extrinsic fraud. Id. at 637, 21 So. 2d at 142. In another status adjudication, on the
other hand, the court recognized a judgment notwithstanding its default nature. Pawley v.
Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950), petition denied, 47 So. 2d 546, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866

(1951).
235.

See von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 56. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v.

Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017
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same manner, foreign default judgments will be recognized as long as require2
ments such as jurisdiction, notice and opportunity to be heard are satisfied. 36
Government Claims
Judgments which involve the penal and revenue laws of a foreign nation
will generally not be enforced by the reviewing court. 23I The identity of the
plaintiff as a sovereign, however, is not automatically determinative of whether
a judgment entered in favor of the government is enforceable. 238 A judgment
is not enforceable if an action was initiated by the foreign government in
furtherance of its interest in public justice. 239 Similarly, money judgments for
tax claims of the sovereign will not be enforceable. 240
A penal decree that is not enforceable may be recognizable to the extent
that it conclusively determines the violation of the foreign penal law. This
"defensive recognition" is significant, for example, when presenting the defense of double jeopardy, or when the question of whether there was a violation of the foreign penal law is material in determining the outcome of a
subsequent action. 241 In such situations, Florida courts could recognize a
24
penal decision of a foreign court without imposing the penalty. 2
FLORIDA JUDGMENTS ABROAD - THE CASE FOR CODIFICATION

While this note has examined the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment in Florida, the reverse situation, in which an unsatisfied judgment
rendered by a Florida court is taken to a foreign nation's court for recognition
and enforcement, must also be considered. The question posed is whether the
foreign court will accord the same generally favorable treatment granted to
foreign judgments by Florida courts or whether the issues must be relitigated.
This section will deal briefly with the enforcement of Florida judgments
in other nations and the potential effect of codification of Florida's common
(1972); New Cent. Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Indus., Ltd., 65 Misc. 2d 653, a18 N.Y.S.2d
980 (Sup. Ct. 1971). Because of the increased possibility of unfairness in these judgments,
courts might be more hesitant to grant the judgments conclusive effect. See Lorenzen, The
Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YALE LJ. 268, 281 (1920).
236. In Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951), a Canadian default judgment was denied recognition when personal service was had, although only service by
publication was required under the foreign law.
237. See von Mehren, supra note 13, at 403 n.10. See generally Stoel, The Enforcement
of Foreign Non-Criminal Penal and Revenue Judgments in England and the United States,
16 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 663 (1967).
238. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 12, at 64.
239. Id. at 64 n.151. For example, the judgment is not enforceable in a penal action
as opposed to an action which was private or commercial in nature.
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT or LAws §120 (1971).
241. See generally Frank, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1096, 1098 (1959); Pye, Effects of Foreign Criminal Judgments Within the
United States, 32 U. Mo. L. REv. 114 (1964). Exceptions to the general rule of nonrecognition
arise in the field of immigration, in which a penal decree may bar an alien from admittance
to the United States, United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931), or
to impeach the credibility of a witness, 3 WIGMoRE EVIDENCE §§980, 987 (3d ed. 1940).
242. Mathor v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 174 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1965).
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law on judgment recognition. Included is a summary of the basic problems
which may arise when the Florida practitioner is called upon to seek execution
of a Florida judgment in a foreign nation.
The treatment granted to a Florida judgment in a foreign court will
generally fall into one of three groups. First, the country may adhere to a
policy which totally precludes the enforcement of foreign judgments absent an
effective mutual enforcement treaty with the rendering nation. 243 In this situation there is little chance of direct recognition and enforcement of the Florida
judgment. The second group consists of countries which do not absolutely
forbid recognition and enforcement of foreign adjucations, but will not grant
the judgment a conclusive or binding effect. In this situation, the Florida
judgment may be wholly or partly reopened and certain issues may be subjected to further findings of fact and law. 244 Finally, there are nations which
require, as a prerequisite to recognition of a foreign judgment, a satisfactory
showing of the existence of reciprocal recognition by the rendering nation..2 45
Because the United States is not a party to any judgment recognition
treaty, 246 a Florida practitioner seeking enforcement of a judgment in one

of the countries which expressly forbids enforcement of foreign decrees absent
such a treaty must seek the services of an attorney in the foreign country to
initiate a new suit on the underlying cause of action.247 Despite nonenforcement of judgments in such nations, however, foreign adjudications have sometimes been defensively recognized to bar a previously unsuccessful party from
initiating an action already fairly and finally adjudicated by the foreign
court.

24 s

In those countries which do not enforce a foreign judgment although enforcement is not expressly forbidden by their code, judgments rendered
abroad are subject to revision au fond, a term of French origin similar to the
American trial de novo. The extent of and conditions for review vary among
countries.2 49 In seeking enforcement of a Florida judgment in a country per243. See text accompanying notes 247-248 infra. For example, enforcement of foreign
judgments in the Netherlands is expressly forbidden unless a treaty has been concluded
with the judgment-rendering nation. See Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in
Treaties on the Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
995, 996 n.8 (1967); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11, at 1608.
Other nations which do not enforce foreign judgments in the absence of a treaty are
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. See Nadelmann, supra note 71, at 245, 249.
In Sweden, however, a judgment which is constitutive in nature, such as a divorce, is enforceable if the adjudicating court had proper jurisdiction pursuant to Swedish law. See
Note. Reciprocal Enforcement of U.S. and Foreign Judgments, 2 TEx. INT'L L.F. 95 n.75
(1966). See generally R. KOLLFwSJN, AMERIcAN-DUTCH

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw

34-36

(2d ed. 1971); Kulzer, supra note 76, at 110; Smit, InternationalRes Judicata in the Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 165 (1966).
244. See text accompanying note 249 infra.
245. See text accompanying notes 250-253 infra.
246. See text accompanying notes 76-82 supra.
247. See R. KOLLEWIJN, supra note 243, at 79.
248. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11, at 1602. See also R. KoLLEwiJN, supra note
243, at 34-38.
249. For a detailed review of the development of the revision au fond doctrine in France

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

37

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 3

1979]

FOREIGN NATION JUDGMENTS

mitting either partial or total revision au fond, the Florida plaintiff should
seek the services of counsel from the foreign nation prior to pursuing the
matter.
The requirements of reciprocal recognition as a prerequisite to the granting of conclusive effect to foreign adjudications2O usually provides that a
foreign nation's judgment will be enforced only to the extent that a valid
judgment from the reviewing nation would be enforced in the judgmentrendering nation. The reciprocity rule is widespread.251 It is therefore inand elsewhere in relation to the status of Florida judgments abroad, see generally Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down and More to Go,
13 Am. J. Comp. L. 72-80 (1964); Nadelmann, supra note 70.
250. The reciprocity requirement evolved from a retaliatory policy. See, e.g., Lenhoff,
Reciprocity in Function: A Problem of Conflict of Laws and International Law, 15 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 44 (1953). See generally Lenhoff, supra note 69.
251. The requirement has been incorporated into the codes of Argentina, Austria, Chile,
Columbia, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, Monaco, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay
and Venezuela. See Clare, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Spain, 9 INT'L LAw. 509,
510 nnA & 5 (1975).
To illustrate, Spain previously recognized judgments from some countries and rejected
others based solely on lack of reciprocity. The controlling provisions are found under article
II of the Codigo Civil and declare that "prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or
property,' and those laws which have as their object the preservation of 'good morals' and
'public order' can in no wise be 'affected by . . . judgments . . . of a foreign country."'
Clare, supra, at 511. LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENrO Cnu arts. 952-954 (cited in Clare, supra, at 510,
nn.4 & 5) correspond to the Code provisions; article 953 states: "If the final judgment comes
from a nation whose jurisprudence does not give effect to Spanish judgments, it win not
be recognized in Spain." Article 954 determines: "If none of the cases referred to in the
preceding articles are applicable, final judgments will be enforceable in Spain if they meet
the following requirements: (1) that the final judgment would have been entered as a result
of a personal action; (2) that it would not have been entered by default; (3) that the
obligation it creates is legal in Spain; (4) that the official certification of the record of the
case meets the requirements of the nation wherein it was entered, in addition to those requirements of Spanish law necessary for its recognition."
Several examples demonstrate how the Spanish courts have applied their reciprocity provision. In one case, a French judgment against a Spanish corporation was presented for
enforcement to a Spanish court by a French plaintiff. Decree of March 24, 1935, Vide
Aranzadi, "Reportorio de Jurisprudencia," No. 621, p. 268 (1935) (cited in Clare, supra, at
512 n.9). Recognition was denied because France did not give conclusive treatment to final
decrees of Spanish courts. However, in another case the Spanish court found an Argentinian
judgment conclusive even though it was not shown that the foreign nation would similarly
recognize Spanish judgments. See Decree of Oct. 28, 1935. Vide Aranzadi "Reportorio de
Jurisprudencia," No. 2041, p. 895 (1935) (cited in Clare, supra, at 512 n.10). The court
applied article 954. On occasion, Spanish courts have denied recognition to judgments from
Belgium, England, Portugal, and Uruguay based solely on the reciprocity element, although
judgments rendered in Mexican courts have been enforced in Spanish territory. See Clare,
supra, at 512-13 nn.11-16. For further discussion of Spain's substantive and procedural laws
governing foreign judgments, see generally, Clare, supra, at 509-15; Schwartz, Enforcement of
Judgments Obtained Under Statute Typified by the "Long-Arm" and "Single-Act" Statutes
In Spain, 1964 A.B.A. PROCExDINcs 235-36 (as cited in Homburger, supra note 28, at 370 n.13).
For examples of reciprocity provisions in other nations, see MENDOZA CODE CM. AND COM.
P., art. 500 (Argentina); CODE OF Civ. P. art. 243 (1903) (Chile); Judicial Code arts. 555556 (1931) (Columbia); CODE OF CIV. P. arts. 512-13 (1879) (Uruguay); CODE Crv. P. art. 747
(1916) (Venezuela). See also Baech, Enforcement of Judgments Obtained Under Statutes
Typified by "Long-Arm" and "Single Act" Statutes in Austria, 1964 A.B.A. PaoEEDINGs 210-11
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evitable that Florida practitioners will frequently be asked to prove the existence of reciprocal recognition in Florida to the satisfaction of a foreign court.
Where the reciprocity requirement exists, the Florida practitioner should inquire as to the methods available for its satisfaction. Some nations acknowledge
the existence of reciprocity only upon certification by the foreign government,
while others permit the reviewing court to make the final determination.2
Because neither federal law nor multiple international treaties are likely to
soon come into existence, resolution of the problem of judgment recognition25s
will be left to the individual states.
It is difficult to determine with any degree of accuracy the precise requirements for recognizing and enforcing a foreign judgment in Florida because
of the scarce and disjointed Florida case law dealing with judgment recognition practices. Furthermore, assuming that the sparse judge-made law of Florida
could be compiled to demonstrate the common law requirements for conclusive
treatment and the frequency of enforcement of foreign judgments in the state,
the problem of comprehension of the common law by foreigners would persist.
Nations with the reciprocity requirement are generally those in which the
legal system is founded on the supremacy of code law rather than on the
(cited in Homburger, supra note 28, at 370 n.11); Law on Judicial Administration,
Oct. 1,
1936, No. 212, §§223(a), 479 (Denmark) (cited in Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 249
n.104);
ZPO art. 328 (Germany) (cited in Note, supra note 243, at 94 n.70). It has been suggested
that the German requirement of reciprocity may affect the ruling of the French
Cour de
cassation regarding giving effect to a foreign judgment. See Kulzer, supra note 76, at
113-14.
It has also been suggested recently that the reciprocity requirement has been so weakened
by
the German high courts as to permit them to disregard the requirement in most
cases. In
addition, common law judgments are now recognized in Germany if the defendant
under
the foreign law is "precluded from attacking a German judgment on the basis of superven-

ing fact." See Carl, supra note 68, at 687 n.54 (citing 2 A. EHRENZWEIG& E.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1973)). But see Kulzer, supra note 76, at
113.

JAYME, PRIVATE

Although individual Mexican state codes regulate the treatment accorded foreign
judgments, the reciprocity requirement is evident in all. See MExico FED. Disr. CODE Crv.
P., art.
604 (6th ed. 1973). See also MINJI SosH6 H6, 1926 (CODE Crv. P. OF JAPAN §200) (translated
in DEBECKER, CODE OF CIV. P. OF JAPAN (1928) and cited in Nadelmann, supra note 70, at
249 n.106); CODE CIv. P., art. 473 (1896) (Monaco) (cited in Nadelmann, supra note
70, at
249 n.108.
Numerous Swiss cantons have included the reciprocity requirement. For example,
BaselCity and Zurich require reciprocity. ZPO art. 258 (Feb. 8, 1975); Gesamtausgabe de
Basler
Gesetzsammlung bis 1929 (1939); Zivilprozessordnung art. 377, (Apr. 13, 1913). See
Note,
supra note 243, at 96 n.79. Geneva and Bern, on the other hand, no longer have the requirement. Id. at 96.
252. Germany, for example, permits the reviewing court to determine the existence
or
nonexistence of reciprocity. Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 252-53. In an early German
case,
Rhein and Mosel Feuerversicherungsaktiengesellschaft,Mar. 26, 1909, 70 RGZ 434
(cited
in Note, supra note 243, at 82 n.26), a German fire insurance company was sued in California
for failure to pay claims resulting from the San Francisco fire. The German court
refused
to accord recognition because of its finding that reciprocal recognition was not accorded
to
German judgments in California. See Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 253.
253. A ground suggested for the present nonexistence of treaties dealing with foreign
judgment recognition is this nation's federal system. Only the federal government
is permitted to negotiate treaties and enforcement and recognition of foreign judgments
is regulated by state law. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 733. See text accompanying notes
40-59
supra.
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doctrine of judicial precedent or stare decisis. 25 4 These civil law nations, unaccustomed to the value placed by this nation's courts on judge-made law,
might refuse to accept case law proof of existing reciprocal recognition. 255
Thus, the foreign court would not determine nor would the foreign government certify that this state conclusively recognizes and enforces its judgments.
Consequently, the Florida judgment would not be enforced.
Civil law nations which require reciprocity will accept a statute from the
judgment-rendering state as proof of this element.- This form of proof is
unavailable to the Florida practitioner seeking to enforce his client's claim
in the nations requiring reciprocity because of the nonexistence of an express
Florida statute on judgment recognition. The practitioner also has the difficult
burden of proving to the satisfaction of foreign courts that Florida's uncertain common law accords conclusive effect to foreign judgments. A viable
solution to promote recognition of Florida judgments abroad must be formulated to ease the Florida practitioner's burden.
CONCLUSION
This note has presented a discussion of the elements to consider when
confronted with questions pertaining to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments in Florida and Florida judgments abroad. At present, the
substantive law governing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
in Florida is found in Florida case law, rather than in any federal common
law, statute or treaty. Nevertheless, because of the nexus with foreign affairs
and the trend of the federal judiciary to assume power to adjudicate such
matters, the question of which law governs, if again confronted by the
United States Supreme Court, could be decided in favor of a federal law mandating national uniformity.- If the Court does not choose to establish substantive rules under a federal common law, a national solution to the recognition and enforcement problem could take the form of additional bilateral or
multilateral treaties, 258 nationwide adoption of uniform laws,2 59 or enactment
of preemptive legislation by the federal government. 26 0 However, until further

254. Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 252. See also R.

SCHLSmINGER, COMPRATVE LAW

177

(2d ed. 1959): "The court in ... civil law jurisdictions will carefully examine the pertinent
[Florida] 'Code' and will infer from its silence that in [Florida] there exists no provision
whatsoever for the enforcement of foreign judgments."
255. For example, a 1953 German Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure contained
a list of 53 nations fulfilling its reciprocity requirement. The United States was not among
them because: 'Toreign judgments are to a large degree recognized by the decisions of the
courts-which, in the main, constitute the sole source of law-but a possibility for reexamining the substance remains to a certain extent. Reciprocity, therefore, cannot be considered as guaranteed." 1 STEIN & JONAS, KOMMENTAR ZUR ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, Comment VI
E. to §32B (18th ed. 1953) (cited in Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 253 nn.132-33). See also
Carl, supra note 68, at 687 n.55.
256. Carl, supra note 68,.at 687.
257. See text accompanying notes 40-59 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 76-82 supra.
259. See text accompanying notes 66-75 supra.
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action is taken, state law will continue to govern. Consequently, the problem
261
of showing reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments will persist.
The problem of reciprocity is particularly acute in relation to Florida
judgments because of the uncertain status of the rule of reciprocity in Florida.
For example, if a foreign court seeking to satisfy its reciprocity element
looked to Florida's case law, it could conclude that Florida's rule is to recognize foreign judgments only to the extent that Florida judgments are
recognized in the rendering nation. 262 This could result in nonrecognition of
the Florida judgment if Florida has not yet recognized any judgment of the
foreign nation. The resulting deadlock on the recognition issue would
further neither the goal of uniform and stable international recognition nor
the goal of enforcement of judgments.
The requirement of reciprocity is undesirable and has been criticized frequently by legal scholars. 26 It is unfair to impose a penalty on private litigants
for the position taken by their government. 26 4 In practice, the requirement
does not further its assumed purpose of assuring that foreign governments
will grant conclusive treatment to the nation's adjudications.2 65 Instead, the
260. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
261. See text accompanying notes 250-256 supra.
Another relevant illustration of the requirement of reciprocal recognition is found in
Mexican law. In Mexico, money judgments from a foreign court will be recognized and
enforced if foreign nation court would accord reciprocal enforcement to similar judgments
rendered by Mexican courts or if there is an effective treaty requiring that judgments from
the foreign nation courts be recognized and enforced. Procedurally, a United States judgment
is enforceable if the following formalities are met: ".That the judgment is rendered
as a consequence of a personal claim against the defendant. 2. -That
the obligation of the defendant for which he has been found liable is a lawful obligation in the Republic of Mexico. 3. - That the defendant has been personally notified to appear before
the Court to defend himself. 4.- That the judgment is final in accordance with the United
States law; that is to say that either no further remedy is available or the time for asking
for such remedy has expired. 5.- That the judgment fulfills all the necessary requirements
to be considered as authentic. 6.- That the judge would be competent to entertain the
case if it were brought originally before the Mexican court. 7.-That the judgment be
translated to Spanish." Letter from Alejandro Ogarrio R.E., Ogarrio, Gaxiola y Diaz, Abogados. Mexico City, Mexico; to Professor Roy Hunt, Associate Dean at the University of
Florida Apr. 26, 1979). If the above-stated formalities are complied with, the Mexican
judge is not permitted to review the merits of the case or to review the reasoning used by
the United States court in reaching its decision. However, in addition to examining the
foreign judgment to determine its authenticity, the Mexican judge may review the judgment to determine whether Mexican law requires enforcement of that judgment. Id.
262. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
263. See text accompanying notes 133-137 supra. Some commentators contend, however,
that the requirement of reciprocal recognition pressures other nations to grant conclusive
effect to judgments of the nations requiring reciprocity. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
11, at 1661-62. But see Nicol v. Tanner, 310 Minn. 68, 78, 256 N.W.2d 796, 801 (1976): "It is
not the business of the courts, whose province is the decision of individual cases, to impose
rules designed to coerce other nations in giving effect to our judgments."
264. See Golomb, supra note 27, at 615; Reese, supra note 28, at 793. See also R. LELAR,
AMERICAN CONFLIcTS LAW §74 (1968).
265. Nicol v. Tanner, 310 Minn. 68, 78, 256 N.W.2d 796, 801 (1976); Carl, supra note 68,
at 685; Golomb, supra note 27, at 616; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11, at 1661-62.
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requirement triggers a domino effect, because an increasing number of nations
respond by enacting similar retaliatory requirements. The result is instability,
lack of uniformity, sacrifice of the interests and rights of private litigants and
66
a general breakdown of recognition practices.2
Codification which dearly delineates the reciprocity doctrine in Florida
would inevitably enhance comprehension of the generally favorable treatment accorded by Florida courts to foreign adjudications. 28 7 This codification
of prevailing common law principles of recognition would facilitate proof of
reciprocity abroad by notifying civil law countries that their judgments are
2 s
recognizable and enforceable in Florida and by clarifying the prevailing law.
Because interpretations of the statutory provisions would ultimately govern
the recognition of a particular judgment, the flexibility of the common law
approach would not be impaired.
At present, American judgments brought for recognition abroad, particularly in civil law countries, do not fare well.29 As Florida's role in the
international community intensifies and as this area of private international
27
law becomes a matter of practical knowledge for the Florida practitioner, 0
it is imperative that action be taken to facilitate the process of enforcing
foreign judgments in Florida and Florida judgments abroad. Although codification of Florida case law would not directly increase the effect given to this
state's judgments in nations with a treaty requirement or in those countries
which provide for partial or entire revision au fond, it would nevertheless be
a significant step toward obtaining recognition of Florida judgments in the
substantial number of countries with reciprocity requirements, 27 1 while re266. Carl, supranote 68, at 685.
267. Willson v. Wilson, 55 So. 2d 905, 906 (Fla. 1951), noted that a valid foreign nation
decree wilt be recognized in Florida (citing Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 866 (1950)).
In its Prefatory Note to the Uniform Recognition Act the National Conference of Commissioners summarized the purpose of the Act as follows: "Codificadon by a state of its
rules on the recognition of money-judgments rendered in a foreign court will make it more
likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recognized abroad." Uniform Recognition
Act, Prefatory Note, 13 U.L.A. 269, 269 (1975). Aside from enactment of the Uniform
Recognition Act, another possible solution is negotiation of a multilateral treaty effective
only in those states accepting the obligations of the treaty. See Ginsburg, supra note 17, at
733. This alternative, however, might have serious constitutional implications with respect
to the power of the federal government to enter into a treaty on judgment recognition
which is binding on all states, whether or not the state chooses to be bound. See generally
Nadelmann, supra note 76.
268. Homburger, supra note 28, at 370; Kulzer, supra note 76, at 99-100. See note 255
supra.

269. This is true despite general agreement among commentators that most states in
the United States will give conclusive effect to foreign judgments. See Golomb, supra note 27,
at 607; Homburger, supra note 28, at 368; Kulzer, supra note 76, at 85, 99; Nadelmann, supra
note 249, at 78; Nadelmann, supra note 71, at 240-41, 256; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 11, at 1602; von Mehren, supra note 13, at 405. See generally H. SMIT & A. MM.R,
supra note 62; Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments, 65 HAv. L. Ray. 1184

(1952).
270. See notes 1-9 supraand accompanying text.
271. Kulzer, supra note 66, at 4; Nadelmann, supra note 70, at 259-62.
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ducing uncertainty in the existing law governing recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Florida.
HILARi6N ARNALDO MARTINEZ LLANEs
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